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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In early 2017, an obscure U.N. official by the name of Dainius Puras—
acting in his capacity as “Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”—
sent a remarkable letter to the Trump Administration via the representative of 
the United States’ permanent mission in Geneva, Switzerland.1 Puras had 
learned of the Administration’s plans to encourage Congress to repeal core 
elements of the Affordable Care Act (popularly known as “ObamaCare”), and 
he wished to alert Congress to the fact that such repeal would violate 
international law. How precisely would it do that? Simple: Repeal would 
violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,2 which allegedly is an 
“expression of international customary law” binding on all states, including 
the United States.3 Repeal would also violate the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,4 which the United States allegedly is 
bound to uphold even though it is not a state party but merely a signatory.5 
Puras urged the Trump Administration to put in place “all necessary interim 
measures” to prevent the purported rights violations,6 and advised of his 
intention to go public with his concerns owing to their felt urgency.7 
It would be easy to laugh this letter off as just another hubristic twitch on 
the part of a minor U.N. bureaucrat – and one not even legally trained at that.8 
Puras’s claims should have struck any lawyer versed in the secondary rules of 
international law formation as highly contestable. Yet I would argue that not 
only should we not laugh too soon at Puras; we should not laugh at all. For 
his foray deep into the heart of American politics was not the isolated and 
aberrant adventure it may have seemed at the time. A mere ten months later, 
 
 1 See Letter from Dainius Puras to Theodore Allegra (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washi 
ngtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2017/04/25/Editorial-Opinion/Graphics/103 
_17_ACA_Repeal_Request_for_Information.pdf?tid=a_inl_manual [hereinafter Puras 
Letter]. 
 2 G.A. Res 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) 
[hereinafter UDHR]. 
 3 Puras Letter, supra note 1, at 3. 
 4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 5 See Puras Letter, supra note 1, at 3. 
 6 Id. at 4. 
 7 See id. at 5. 
 8 Puras is a doctor, with no discernible legal training. See Dana Milbank, Apparently 




88 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L [Vol. 48:85 
no less esteemed an international lawyer than Philip Alston visited the United 
States in his role as “UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human 
Rights” and made similar problematic claims about the sources of 
international legal obligation, this time in a not-so-subtle bid to get the Trump 
Administration to back away from its tax-reform agenda.9 Alston’s public 
statement, issued in December 2017 after a two-week “poverty tour” of the 
United States, reads in pertinent part: 
Successive administrations, including the present one, have 
determinedly rejected the idea that economic and social rights 
are full-fledged human rights, despite their clear recognition 
not only in key treaties that the US has ratified (such as the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination), and in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights which the US has long insisted other countries must 
respect. But denial does not eliminate responsibility, nor does 
it negate obligations. International human rights law 
recognizes a right to education, a right to healthcare, a right to 
social protection for those in need, and a right to an adequate 
standard of living. In practice, the United States is alone 
among developed countries in insisting that while human 
rights are of fundamental importance, they do not include 
rights that guard against dying of hunger, dying from a lack of 
access to affordable healthcare, or growing up in a context of 
total deprivation.10 
Alston’s tone was matter-of-fact to the point of being blasé. However, the 
substance of his statements and suggestions should have turned heads–and not 
in a good way. Is it really the case that a state’s determined denial of an 
obligation fails to relieve it of responsibility to fulfil that obligation under 
international law? Or that formally non-binding and aspirational resolutions 
passed in the U.N. General Assembly impose duties that states may neither 
ignore nor honor in the breach? Or that non-conforming state practice is to be 
regarded as irresponsible state self-ostracism from the international 
community rather than legitimate self-protection from it? Surely given his 
prior scholarship in the area of sources of international law Alston would 
 
 9 See Jake Johnson, UN Report Condemns Trump Admin for ‘Deliberately’ Creating 
Devastating Inequality, ZEROHEDGE (June 4, 2018), https://www.zerohedge.com/news/ 
2018-06-04/un-report-condemns-trump-admin-deliberately-creating-devastating-inequalit 
y. 
 10 Statement on Visit to the USA, by Professor Philip Alston, UNITED NATIONS HUM. 
RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/P 
ages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22533. 
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know to give highly qualified answers to each of these questions.11 And yet 
there he was, sitting on the doorstep of a newly-minted Presidency, loudly 
proclaiming the United States to be effectively an international outlaw, and 
lamenting the fact that U.S. officials were not prepared to defer to legal and 
political decisions made at the international level. An unnecessarily officious 
exercise on Alston’s part? Perhaps.12 Yet in truth it was hardly surprising. 
Whether Alston knew it or not, both he and Puras were taking a page out of a 
very old playbook, one written twenty-five years earlier by American legal 
scholar Jonathan Charney.13 
The year was 1993. Charney looked out on the world and saw a set of 
brewing and formidable crises. Problems that presented as global in nature—
climate change, international terrorism, and economic instability—seemed to 
require global solutions, yet the Westphalian-based ideal of state sovereignty 
was standing stubbornly in the way.14 The ability of any given state to dissent 
from, and opt out of, a course of remedial action agreed to at the international 
level was imperiling the achievement of crucial public goods on a worldwide 
scale.15 Charney’s mission, as he saw it, was to find a way to steamroll the 
dissenters.16 This would require, at the very least, circumventing the principle 
of state consent as the basis of international legal obligation. Charney astutely 
recognized a potentially useful tool of coercion in the doctrine of sources: 
The secondary rules of recognition govern the process by 
which rules of international law are established. . . . Thus, if 
the secondary rules require unanimity before a primary rule 
 
 11 See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTRL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1992). 
 12 Alston’s invocation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination was a particularly cheap shot. 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter 
CERD]. CERD does mention social and economic rights, but only for the purpose of 
prohibiting discrimination relative to their exercise should they be recognized, not of 
declaring them as such. The U.S. Senate that ratified the CERD clearly understood the 
difference: “States are not required by [CERD] Article 5 to ensure observance of each of 
the rights listed in that article, but rather to prohibit discrimination in the enjoyment of 
those rights to the extent they are provided by the domestic law.” S. REP. NO. 103-29 
(1994), at 28 [hereinafter Senate Report]. The Senate made this distinction against the 
backdrop of both persistent legislative resistance to the ICESCR and settled law holding 
that economic rights are not protected under any provision of the U.S. Constitution. For 
background on these points, see Barbara Stark, At Last? Ratification of the Economic 
Covenant as a Congressional-Executive Agreement, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 107 (2011). 
 13 Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (1993). 
 14 See id. at 529-30. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See id. at 531 (“In this article, I explore the limits of state autonomy to determine 
whether some or all of international law may be made universally binding regardless of the 
position of one or a small number of unwilling states.”). 
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may enter into international law for all states, as a practical 
matter, the possibility of universal rules will be foreclosed 
unless the secondary rules are changed.17 
And changed they have been. Over the course of the last twenty-five years, 
international legal scholars—aided by sympathetic officials in 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs, 
respectively)—have taken up Charney’s challenge of altering the doctrine of 
sources to get the international community past that all-important point at 
which “state sovereignty gives way to the legal and political supremacy of 
global institutions.” 18 They have sought to evolve the old doctrine of sources 
into a new one that redounds to international power structures and detracts 
from national ones. In reality their task has been two-fold: (1) To secure 
adjustments to the rules of international law-formation which make it easier 
for international actors to bind dissenting states to their decisions as a matter 
of international law; and (2) to secure adjustments to domestic rules of 
international law internalization which make it harder for national actors to 
ignore or act counter to international legal standards. The need for this second 
prong of what I shall call the “Sources Project” will be readily apparent, as it 
would make little sense (from a globalist’s perspective) to go to the trouble of 
building a Cadillac of international law only to have to leave it idling out on 
the road because one could not get it parked inside the domestic garage. Hence 
the need for scholars like former Yale Law School dean (and senior State 
Department official) Harold Koh, who has assiduously worked the domestic 
level of the Sources Project for the last thirty years. In one of his most recent 
bids to get the new international law “in,” Koh echoed Charney in warning 
his colleagues that unless they abandon traditional constitutional doctrine 
regarding presidential authority to conclude international agreements, the 
international-law project will stall: 
 
 17 Id. at 533-34. Charney was by no means the first legal scholar to think along these 
lines, though his formulation of the perceived challenge was arguably the most compact 
and candid. Writing over ten years earlier, Jeffrey Blum and Ralph Steinhardt had claimed 
to see a similar inadequacy in an international system that lacked ways to bind states legally 
to rules they opposed. See Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction 
over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (1981). In 1986, Louis Sohn urged states “to adapt the 
methods of law-creation to the needs of the rapidly growing and changing world 
community.” Louis B. Sohn, ‘Generally Accepted’ International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 
1073, 1079 (1986). And in 1990, Theodor Meron cited “the enlightened interest of the 
international community in extending the reach and in strengthening the effectiveness of 
essential norms of international public order” in encouraging the International Court of 
Justice to be bolder in its findings of customary norms. THEODORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 114 (1991). 
 18 Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global 
Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1266 
(2005). 
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As we move from diplomatic dialogue to political 
commitments to soft regimes to shared norms to legal rules to 
international institutions, we should not impose a formal 
triptych on novel ways of negotiating international 
arrangements, because such rules make such arrangements 
nearly impossible to achieve.19 
The sense of mission and sheer enthusiasm of the scholars who responded 
positively to Charney’s challenge was evident early on. Writing in 1999, Paul 
Stephan—one scholar who did not so respond—noted with alarm that: 
[I]t seems surprising how infrequently the community of 
international law scholars contemplates arguments against the 
expansion of international law’s domain. . . . [T]o a far greater 
extent than in other fields, academic specialists seem to accept 
the fundamental desirability of the subject in which they are 
expert and to believe that the world needs more international 
law, not less.20 
Indeed, so uncritically did the international lawyers of his day view the 
expansion of international law’s empire that Stephan felt the need to admonish 
them to “get beyond the simple equation of international law with progressive 
development and invite the kind of wide-open inquiry that we have come to 
take for granted elsewhere.” 21 Motivated by similar concerns, and writing just 
a few years later, Kenneth Anderson suggested that the evidence of the 
collapse of traditional state sovereignty was being “wildly exaggerated” in the 
scholarly literature on global governance.22 Even the International Law 
Commission (ILC)—a body not easily moved to gratuitous action—recently 
felt the need to chide sources scholars for their tendency to forsake analysis 
for advocacy.23 
Equally palpable has been these scholars’ sense of their own power and 
influence. Unlike their political scientist colleagues, globalist legal scholars 
have long been aware that, courtesy of Article 38(d) of the Statute of the 
 
 19 Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century 
International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J. F. 338, 365 (2017). 
 20 Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law—Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, 
and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1586 (1999). 
 21 Id. at 1587. 
 22 Anderson, supra note 18, at 1300. 
 23 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary 
International Law, with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018) at Conclusion 14, cmt. 
(3) [hereinafter Draft Conclusions]. Charney’s own 1993 article had a highly prescriptive 
feel to it even though he claimed merely to be describing a newly emerging process of CIL-
formation. 
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International Court of Justice (ICJ),24 they do indeed have a formal seat at the 
table when it comes to identifying the rules of international law, including the 
identification of the secondary rules of recognition. In 2002, Ernest Young 
went so far as to accuse certain scholars of harboring “delusions of grandeur” 
in regard to their role in the formation and articulation of customary 
international law (CIL) norms.25 Yet Young’s criticism, while understandable, 
was arguably misplaced. As Stephan was quick to perceive, there was nothing 
delusional about the scholars’ sense of power, for the power was very real. 
Stephan saw it clearly at work in the pre-Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain26 debate 
concerning the self-execution of the CIL of human rights, where the scholars 
had helped to build a “great edifice” of doctrine out of two suggestive 
Supreme Court cases.27 “Either human rights law will fulfil the ambitions of 
its academic supporters through increasingly bold accomplishments,” Stephan 
predicted in 2000, “or it will fall back . . . .”28 He left his readers with the 
distinct impression that he thought the scholars would win.29 
Having a sense of mission and of power, however, has not insulated 
globalist scholars from criticism, nor assured them victory. They have indeed 
faced opposition, albeit from a fairly small minority from within the academic 
community. Writing in 1988, Arthur Weisburd took aim at Blum and 
Steinhardt’s work and expressed sheer exasperation at the notion that one 
might, via scholarly ipse dixit, alter the doctrine of sources to achieve a “world 
order.”30 He specifically contested the then-blossoming view that CIL could 
be derived almost automatically from any provision of a norm-creating 
character of any treaty or convention.31 Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith all 
but accused their fellow scholars of committing an intellectual coup d’etat by 
inserting the so called Modern Position regarding the self-executing nature of 
CIL under U.S. law into the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States.32 Stephan went so far as to suggest that American 
scholars’ influence in CIL-formation “seem[ed] the antithesis of 
 
   24 Statue of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
   25 Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 365, 391 (2002). 
   26 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
  27 Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 237, 241 (2000). 
   28 Id. at 242. 
   29 Id. at 246. 
   30 Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 42-45 (1988). 
 31 Id. at 23-30. 
 32 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International 
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 341-45 (1997) (recounting the 
authors’ criticism of the origins of the Modern Position). 
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democracy.”33 And passion seems to have begotten passion. On the globalists’ 
side, Koh has reacted to the nationalistic bent of the Trump Administration 
with some highly unconventional proposals and calls-to-action that are 
designed to keep the Sources Project moving forward at all cost.34 The unusual 
bitterness that has characterized some of these debates—with references to 
“heated criticism,”35 “heated spats,” 36 “fierce arguments,” 37 “pitched and 
occasionally intemperate debate,”38 “angry responses,” 39 “distorted” 
accounts,”40 views put forward “without a sense of . . . intellectual history and 
without any effort to explain [their] justifications,” 41 and “polarization” that 
is “unhelpful and inaccurate” 42—is incomprehensible unless one realizes that 
the more nationalistically minded scholars have not only been staking out 
alternative positions of a technical, academic nature. These scholars have been 
throwing wrenches into a well-oiled machine that at one point had been well 
on its way to delivering a massive shift in power away from the most 
democratically accountable institutions of the modern nation-state toward far 
less accountable “others.”43 
If one takes stock of the scholarly discourse as a whole, it is clear that a 
quiet war has been raging around the Sources Project for some time. Bradley, 
who has fought many intellectual battles for the nationalist camp, seemed to 
sense as much when in a footnote to a 2007 article about unratified treaties he 
noted that: 
[t]he effort to increase the obligations on signatory nations can 
be seen as part of a more general effort by advocacy groups, 
international institutions, and some scholars to relax formal 
and consent-based requirements for the imposition of 
international obligations. Other examples might include a less 
practice-based conception of customary international law, 
restrictions on the ability of nations to opt out of customary 
international law, concepts of jus cogens norms that are 
 
 33 Stephan, supra note 27, at 246. 
 34 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 35 Stephan, supra note 27, at 242. 
 36 Young, supra note 25, at 366. 
 37 Stephan, supra note 27, at 237. 
 38 Id. at 241. 
 39 Young, supra note 25, at 367. 
 40 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 341. 
 41 Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE 
L.J. 202, 206 (2010). 
 42 JAMES A. GREEN, THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR RULE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 282 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2016). 
 43 As will be discussed infra Part II, these “others” comprise not only the almost wholly 
unaccountable class of international actors but also the least accountable national ones, viz. 
the judiciary and the bureaucracy. 
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binding without regard to state consent, and severability of 
purportedly invalid treaty reservations.44 
However, while Bradley limned the contours of this “more general effort,” 
neither he nor any other scholar has explored it with the scrutiny it deserves. 
As he and Goldsmith acknowledged in their recent comprehensive study of 
presidential power to shape U.S. commitments under international law,45 
sometimes only a broad canvassing of the many specific manifestations of a 
phenomenon can give us a sense of what precisely is at stake—of what we 
have lost, what we have saved, and what we may yet regain. This Article 
aspires to be that broader chronicle. In Parts I and II, I undertake a mostly 
descriptive survey of the main battles that have been fought on both the 
international and domestic levels of the Sources Project. In doing so, I hope 
not only to afford an appreciation of the ways in which globalist scholars have 
sought to mobilize the doctrine of sources against the authority of the nation-
state, but also to provide a more perceptive account than is currently available 
of the current state of that doctrine. In Part III I explore an interesting 
normative aspect of the Sources Project, viz. the key historical and theoretical 
assumptions that seem to have legitimized the Project in the eyes of its 
scholarly promoters. 
My own opinion of the Sources Project will undoubtedly be clear from this 
Article’s title. The word “corruption” is a strong word, far stronger than the 
morally neutral “change” or even the negatively-connotative “manipulation.” 
Like a small group of other international law scholars, I am a proudly 
unreconstructed democratic-sovereigntist who believes the Sources Project is 
flawed from a political-morality standpoint owing to the highly questionable 
end that it serves, namely “globalization.” This overused term has different 
meanings depending upon the context. Here I shall use it to denote the 
diffusion of national political power upward toward trans-, supra- and 
international organizations and authorities, often via the activities of the least 
politically accountable elements of domestic officialdoms (viz. civil servants 
and judges).46 I use the word “corruption” for the further reason that globalist 
legal scholars have at times been so result-oriented in their approach to 
sources that they have not always adhered to the standards of intellectual 
honesty, consistency of principle, and restraint that we usually take for granted 
 
 44 Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 331 n.114 (2007). 
 45 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International Law, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1205 (2018). 
 46 If judged by its fruits, globalization is the process by which “the residuum of authority 
left in our national government seems an ever-diminishing domain.” Stephan, supra note 
27, at 237. See also Stephan, supra note 20, at 1578 (“[I]ncreasingly the rules that shape 
what [domestic actors] may or must do represent the choices of international organs rather 
than national parliaments and bureaucracies”). 
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in academic discourse.47 This is not to say, of course, that such scholars are 
bad men and women. In fact, quite the opposite is true. More than anyone else, 
they recall the civil-rights lawyers of the mid-twentieth century who 
passionately tried to bring forth a better society based on a reinterpretation of 
the secondary rules of the U.S. Constitution relating to the reach of the federal 
government’s power over the states.48 
Yet there are differences. The federal government whose power those 
twentieth-century lawyers were seeking to vindicate was a reasonably 
transparent and democratically-accountable one; the international governance 
structure is not. Stephan noted the obvious in 1999 when he wrote that: 
[t]he processes that generate the new international law are 
several steps removed from the usual mechanisms that hold 
lawmakers accountable for their decisions. . . . To be sure, 
accountability is not completely absent in the new 
international law. . . . But, on the whole, the makers of the new 
international law find it easier to avoid the consequences of 
their decisions than do most national lawmakers.49 
That, I submit, was putting it mildly. Writing a few years later, Rubenfeld 
rightly refused to pull any punches: 
There is, among international lawyers, a hazy notion that the 
emergence of the international community in the world of law 
and politics is itself a democratic development. The 
unfortunate reality, however, is that international law is a 
threat to democracy and to the hopes of democratic politics all 
over the world. For some, that may be a reason to support 
internationalism; for others, a reason to oppose it. Either way, 
the fundamental conflicts between democracy and 
international law must be recognized.50 
Another important difference between then and now is that the secondary 
rules at issue in the civil rights era were reinterpreted not so much in order to 
create new power as to reflect it. The federal government’s conclusive power 
 
 47 I shall call attention to such lapses as they present themselves. 
 48 This reach is most notable with the commerce power and the power to implement the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 49 Stephan, supra note 20, at 1578-79. 
 50 Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, 27 WILSON Q. Autumn 2003, at 22, 34 (2003). 
See also Amy Baker Benjamin, The Many Faces of Secrecy, 8 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 
1, 43-48 (2017) (analyzing the international order’s transparency-deficit); Anderson, supra 
note 18, passim (analyzing the international order’s democracy-deficit). I return to this 
topic infra Part III.C. 
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over the states originated in the crucible of the Civil War. A massive de facto 
event—literal northern boots on the southern ground—eventually resulted, 
many decades later, in substantial de jure innovation, not the other way 
around. Holmes acknowledged as much when, in narrowly interpreting the 
scope of the 10th Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states, he 
observed: 
It was enough for [the Framers of the Constitution] to realize 
or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a 
century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to 
prove that they created a nation. . . . We must consider what 
this country has become in deciding what that amendment has 
reserved.51 
Contrast that order of events with Koh’s contemporary “high-stakes 
gamble” (his term) to legitimize easier ways for the President to commit the 
United States to international agreements—the goal of which, not the cause 
of which, is the “transform[ation] [of] national identity.”52 In globalism’s case 
a small cadre of rule-writers are seeking to transform an entire national 
identity. Simply to describe such an effort is, I submit, to condemn it. 
The bottom line is that for the past twenty-five years globalist legal 
scholars have been embarked on a mission of dubious merit for which there 
is little precedent. The story is not a pretty one, nor flattering of its would-be 
protagonists. Thankfully its ending has yet to be written. 
II.  PART I: THE SOURCES PROJECT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
A. Retooling CIL to Cure the Mischief of Treaties and of Aspiration 
 
i. Charney’s Authoritarian, yet Transparent, CIL 
 
Charney’s foundational article was based on a subtle act of misdirection. 
He began his analysis of the then-existing doctrine of sources with two quick 
paragraphs suggesting that the rules relating to treaty-making did not pose a 
danger to globalization.53 The role of state consent in treaty-making, he 
assured his readers, was “limited, at best.” 54 It was not until the final page of 
his essay that Charney revealed his actual opinion, which was that treaty-
making represented the biggest impediment to globalization precisely because 
 
 51 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920) (emphasis added). 
 52 Koh, supra note 19, at 365. 
   53 See Charney, supra note 13, at 534-35. 
 54 Id. at 534. 
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of its sovereignty-protecting attributes.55 His reasoning was candid and highly 
revealing: 
Much of the demand for international law has been filled by 
treaties accepted as binding by state parties. Treaties, however, 
are unable to serve all the international legal requirements of 
the contemporary world. Treaties often require considerable 
time to be negotiated, adopted and brought into force. It is also 
impracticable to have treaties on all subjects of international 
law. Most importantly, states’ adherence to treaties rarely 
approaches universal participation. Domestic law usually 
requires complex formal acts before treaties are accepted as 
binding. In contrast, general international law [i.e. CIL] may 
be established on the basis of less formal indications of consent 
or acquiescence. This makes worldwide law possible; it cannot 
be done through treaties alone.56 
Charney was right. Treaty-making as it was then understood and practiced 
was too grounded in state consent to be of use to globalists.57 Indeed, the entire 
treaty-making process was rife with opportunities for states to withhold their 
consent from proposed international rules and thereby avoid being bound. 
States could refuse to sign treaties either out of dislike of substantive treaty 
provisions or of the treaty form itself.58 If they signed, they could refuse to 
ratify. If they ratified, they could interpose reservations, understandings, or 
declarations (RUDS) that tailored the treaty to their own special needs and 
concerns. Provided their constitutional processes were dualist in nature, they 
could decline to implement a ratified treaty. Finally, even if they signed, 
ratified, and implemented a treaty, they could successfully withdraw from it 
at a later date if they changed their mind in most instances. For a globalist 
legal scholar trying to build a non-consensual body of international law, 
treaties and their various flexibility mechanisms posed nothing but 
headaches.59 CIL, on the other hand, not only rested on “less formal 
 
  55 See id. at 551. 
   56 Id. at 551. 
   57 As I discuss infra Part I.B, globalists have recently implemented a range of strategies, 
internal to the treaty form and/or its application, that are designed to diminish the 
consensual nature of treaty commitments. 
   58 Some states, for example, opposed adopting the document that became the UDHR in 
binding treaty form. See Hilary Charlesworth, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 7 (2008), https:// 
opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e887. 
   59 Accord Mario Prost, Hierarchy and the Sources of International Law, 39 HOUST. J. 
INT’L L. 285, 303-04 (2017). Prost writes: 
[T]he notion of non-consensual law-making has always appealed to 
scholars committed to the ideal of universal law and frustrated with the 
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indications of consent or acquiescence;” it was admirably self-executing even 
in many otherwise dualist states.60 It also denied states a right of unilateral 
exit post-crystallization.61 Charney saw in CIL an appealing alternative to 
treaty-making precisely because of its coercive potential. His attitude 
represented an abandonment of the early post-war academic enthusiasm for 
treaties (and, indeed, for nationalism) as the preferred vehicles for delivering 
improvements in the human condition.62 
But before CIL could step into its new role, it would need a new doctrinal 
look, and this new look would require some justification. Here again Charney 
resorted to misdirection. He first tried to convince his readers that the need for 
a CIL retooling was grounded in genuine concerns over transparency and 
sovereignty.63 The presumption that state silence during the period of CIL 
norm-gestation equalled knowing and voluntary consent, he cautioned, 
masked “the reality that many states do not know that the law is being made 
and thus have not formed an opinion.”64 Yet if Charney had been genuinely 
 
strict contractual nature of treaties and the limits inherent in voluntary 
law-making. . . . Many scholars have highlighted what they see as the 
inherent inadequacy of treaty law and its emphasis on state consent in 
dealing with global public good challenges . . . . In this context, treaty-
making becomes problematic as it gives any state the right to object to 
the formation of any proposed rule of international law. 
For a fairly recent example of scholars’ and activists’ displeasure with treaties, see Monica 
Hakimi, Custom’s Method and Process: Lessons from Humanitarian Law, in CUSTOM’S 
FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 148, 155 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 
2016) (describing how the lack of universal ratification of the Additional Protocols to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions became “untenable” with the maturation of international human 
rights law and required rectification by an “ambitious” customary international 
humanitarian law project). 
 60 Including, to some extent, the pre-Sosa United States. See infra Part II.A. 
 61 Bradley and Gulati label as the “Mandatory View” the conventional wisdom that once 
a CIL rule becomes established, nations never have the unilateral right to withdraw from 
it. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 204-05. Their research indicates that the 
Mandatory View emerged during the years 1890-1920 at the instigation of Western states 
concerned to ensure that emerging non-Western states would not be able to opt out of the 
customary rules that had been developed during the centuries of European imperial rule. 
See id. at 226-31. 
 62 See Prost, supra note 59, at 305-06 (noting this enthusiasm among Third World 
scholars in particular). Charney was by no means alone. Writing in 1998, Charlesworth 
confirmed that “[m]any jurists regard custom as a useful mechanism that can compensate 
for the rigidity of treaty law, and have argued for the expansion of the category.” Hilary 
Charlesworth, The Unbearable Lightness of Customary International Law, 92 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 44, 44 (1998). For a more recent confirmation of this attitude, see Timothy 
Meyer, Collective Decision-Making in International Governance, 108 AJIL UNBOUND 30, 
34 (2014). 
 63 Charney, supra note 13, at 537. 
      64 Id.; see also id. at 538. Charney writes: 
For political purposes . . . it may be desirable to engage in the fiction that 
failure to object constitutes consent or acquiescence. In fact, law is made 
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concerned to secure for states meaningful opportunities to express their 
consent to the rules that would bind them, he presumably would not have been 
trying to marginalize treaty-making as a source of international law. It was 
not until deep within his article that Charney disclosed his real reason for 
advocating a “new look” CIL, via these few quick remarks: 
Traditional textbook accounts of customary international 
lawmaking describe an amorphous process in which a pattern 
of behaviour developed by states acting in their self-interest 
over a long period of time is coupled with opinions that the 
practice reflects a legal obligation (opinio juris). . . . 
Traditional customary law formation may have sufficed when 
both the scope of international law and the number of states 
were limited. Today, however, the subject matter has 
expanded substantially into areas that were traditionally the 
preserve of states’ domestic jurisdiction. In addition, the 
number of states has dramatically increased, together with 
their diversity. The relatively exclusive ways of the past are 
not suitable for contemporary circumstances.65 
Translation: In a world of economically and culturally diverse states, no 
significant CIL rules were likely to emerge as long as CIL-formation remained 
rooted in the physical (and self-interested) practices of states.66 The real 
problem with traditional CIL for Charney was therefore not its claimed 
authoritarian nature, but just the opposite. Given the inductive methodology 
by which it was assessed, traditional CIL could not help but reflect, to a large 
if imperfect extent, the very needs, wishes, and judgments of states that 
Charney thought were preventing the global community from dealing with 
urgent global problems and concerns. A universal law of human rights would 
 
without the conscious acceptance of most states. Traditionally, 
customary law has been made by a few interested states for all. 
Id. This type of criticism of traditional CIL has appeared almost as a matter of course in 
the works of globalist scholars. For a small but representative sampling over the past 
twenty-five years, see GREEN, supra note 42, at 248-49; Andrew T. Guzman, Saving 
Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 141-44 (2005); Anthea Roberts, 
Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 
95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 767 (2001). Its purpose has generally not been to lay the 
groundwork for sovereignty-protecting reforms but, somewhat perversely, to make the 
scholars’ sovereignty-limiting proposals seem less threatening. Roberts’s own proposal 
was to enlist certain philosophical ideas of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin as tie-breakers 
in cases of ambiguous physical state practice. 
 65 Charney, supra note 13, at 543. 
 66 Cf. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 244 (noting that “wide variations in ethnicity, 
culture, politics, resources, and economics” across the world’s 192 nations “make it less 
likely that the aggregation of state practice, which is the basis for traditional CIL-formation, 
will generate efficient rules”) (citation omitted). 
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be particularly difficult to forge on the back of the traditional practice-based 
CIL, in part because it was “still customary for a depressingly large number 
of States to trample upon the human rights of their nationals,”67 but also 
because the content and scope of human rights was (and to a significant extent 
remains) contestable.68 
Given that, for his purposes, Charney needed a more authoritarian version 
of CIL-formation than existed at the time, the substance of his proposal for a 
new type of CIL was hardly surprising. A “newly evolving process” 69 of CIL-
formation was emerging, Charney announced, one rooted in the work-product 
of IGOs, regional organizations, and multilateral diplomatic conferences 
instead of in the physical practice of states.70 These fora would consider norms 
presented in many different types of procedural dress (e.g. “proposals, reports, 
resolutions, treaties or protocols” 71). What was important was not the 
“technical legal status of the form in which [solutions] emerged from the 
multilateral forum,”72 but the clarity of “the intention to promote a norm of 
generally applicable international law” 73 and the strength of “the consensus 
in favor of the norm.” 74 Eminent scholars would be on hand to assess fora 
debates with a keen eye and a sensitive touch to determine whether a norm 
had definitively emerged.75 Most importantly, dissenting states—which 
Charney invariably chose to describe pejoratively (viz. “obstinate,” 76 
“recalcitrant” 77)—could be outvoted with prejudice.78 
Charney did not acknowledge the disenfranchisement that the world’s 
citizenries were likely to suffer as a result of the ascendancy of this new 
authoritarian CIL. Owing to its relatively slow formation, as well as its roots 
 
 67 Charney, supra note 13, at 551. 
 68 See Rubenfeld, supra note 50, at 30 (“The American view holds that democratic 
nations can sometimes differ on matters of fundamental rights.”). Space for reasonable 
disagreement and alternative regulatory approaches would seem to exist, at a minimum, 
apropos the issues of hate speech, abortion, the death penalty, gun control, and human 
migration. 
 69 Charney, supra note 13, at 551. 
 70 Id. at 543-44. 
 71 Id. at 544. 
 72 Id. at 545. 
 73 Id. at 546. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See id. at 545 n.62-63 (noting that “[s]ensitive analyses of the results produced by 
such forums are necessary” and appearing to endorse Antonio Cassese for the position of 
norm-caller-in-chief). 
 76 Id. at 551. 
 77 Id. at 529. 
 78 See id. at 544 (“[O]pposition by a small number of participating states may not stop 
the movement of the proposed rule toward law.”); id. at 545 (suggesting that the objections 
of “relatively isolated states” could be overridden); id. at 550 (“If universality is chosen, 
notwithstanding the objections of a small minority, it will be only after all interests have 
been considered . . . .”). 
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in a physical state practice that usually involved more than just a handful of 
appointed officials, traditional CIL was arguably far more visible to the 
attentive portion of a national demos—and thus more subject to its scrutiny 
and criticism—than Charney’s new CIL could ever hope to be. Indeed, how 
could any citizenry hope to preserve an ex ante voice in a system of “rapid” 
CIL-formation in which “one clearly phrased and strongly endorsed 
declaration at a near-universal diplomatic forum could be sufficient to 
establish new international law”?79 His silence on this point was perhaps to be 
expected: the word “democracy” did not appear a single time in his article, 
not even in the few brief sentences he devoted to discussing the merits of 
sovereignty,80 and he seems to have been little troubled by the concept. 
Charney did, however, keenly appreciate the level of opposition his proposals 
were likely to meet from national governments,81 and he sought to reassure 
them in a variety of ways. 
First, by describing potential dissenting states as obstinate and 
recalcitrant,82 Charney conveyed a high level of confidence in the substantive 
normativity of the CIL that would emerge from the new process. The 
possibility of good-faith dissent—of disagreeing and opposing because the 
nominated way forward on any given issue is subject to reasonable criticism—
did not seem to occur to him.83 Second, he noted that rulemaking by majority 
vote already existed in certain IGOs and rhetorically asked why it should not 
 
 79 Id. at 546-47. Sovereignty-minded scholars had little difficulty seeing the democratic 
deficit inherent in Charney’s new CIL. See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of 
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 519 (2000) (“[T]he majority of 
nations and peoples of the world rarely participate in the creation of customary rules that 
limit their policy choices and sovereignty”); Stephan, supra note 27, at 238 (describing the 
new CIL as “a prefabricated system of rules and norms constructed by a loose alliance of 
like-minded academics and international law specialists through a form of advocacy that 
involves no democratic checks”). 
 80 See Charney, supra note 13, at 530. 
 81 See id. at 550 (“Government officials are jealous of their state’s sovereignty and 
autonomy and are loathe to adopt rules that bind dissenters. For they know that at some 
point their state may be on the dissenting side of an issue.”) (citation omitted). 
  82 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
 83 Nor has it occurred to many globalist scholars writing in his wake. Charlesworth, for 
example, felt comfortable asserting without argument in 1998 that a positivistic 
international system catering to the self-interests of sovereign states “leads us to an 
unbearably light, bleak, ethically unsatisfying dead end.” Charlesworth, supra note 62, at 
46. Several years later, her protégé, Anthea Roberts, noted with no apparent qualms that: 
[t]he international community discounts the importance of dissenting 
states and contrary state practice because it is not prepared to recognize 
exceptions to the maintenance of certain fundamental values. . . . The 
substantive normativity of modern custom can therefore be used to 
justify a reduced focus on procedural normativity and descriptive 
accuracy. 
Roberts, supra note 64, at 766. 
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also exist for CIL.84 Third, by misrepresenting the role state consent played 
generally within the international system, Charney sought to mute the 
revolutionary nature of the coercive new CIL he was proposing.85 Fourth, he 
repeatedly assured his readers that international officials and scholars could 
be trusted not to abuse their new power to make and find CIL for the world 
community.86 Fifth, and somewhat relatedly, he pledged that the new CIL 
would not deviate unduly from physical state practice.87 Sixth and finally, he 
touted the procedural normativity of the new CIL process. All states, 
regardless of their wealth or power, would have the opportunity to participate 
fully in consideration of proposed CIL norms,88 and there would be 
heightened transparency regarding the precise status of each debated norm.89 
 
 84 See Charney, supra note 13, at 544 n.61. In making this point Charney neglected to 
mention that, although it may be costly to do so, any state outvoted in the IGO context can 
avoid the reach of adverse rules by invoking the nuclear option of exiting the IGO 
altogether. See Stephan, supra note 27, at 249-50. As noted supra note 61 and 
accompanying text, unilateral withdrawal has not traditionally been a legal option for states 
in the CIL context. 
 85 In difference to Charney, Louis Henkin, an ideological ally, did not seek to downplay 
the radical nature of CIL’s transformation. See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
POLITICS AND VALUES 37 (1995) (noting that the changes in the way CIL was beginning to 
be created marked “a radical innovation, and indeed reflect[ed] a radical conception.”) 
Other scholars hewed to a middle position that applauded the new CIL while cautioning 
against going too far, too fast, lest a backlash ensue. See, e.g., Meron, supra note 17, at 
114; Charlesworth, supra note 62, at 46. 
 86 See Charney, supra note 13, at 540-41 (risk of abuse of new lawmaking authority is 
“slight”); id. at 548 (“While it is possible that the [new CIL] process may be abused, it is 
less open to abuse and miscommunication than classical customary lawmaking”); id. at 
550 (sovereignty and autonomy interests will be taken into account before universality is 
chosen); id. at 551 (international legal system will invoke new lawmaking authority 
“sparingly”). Regarding this last assurance, Charney almost immediately contradicted 
himself. Compare id. at 530 (“Today, the enormous destructive potential of some activities 
and the precarious condition of some objects of international concern make full autonomy 
undesirable.”), with id. at 531 (“I explore the limits of state autonomy to determine whether 
some or all of international law may be made universally binding regardless of the position 
of one or a small number of unwilling states.”) (emphases added). 
 87 See id. at 546 n.71 (“Certainly, if the state practice is inconsistent with the principle 
adopted at the international forum, that principle would be open to serious question.”). This 
promise, however, was belied by the near-contemporaneous assessment of Simma and 
Alston, who saw in the new approach “a law-making process which is more or less 
complete in itself, even in the face of contrasting ‘external’ facts.” Simma & Alston, supra 
note 11, at 90. 
 88 See Charney, supra note 13, at 547, 550-51. 
 89 Charney seems to have envisioned a deliberative, legislative-like process in which 
proposed norms would come with clear labels indicating whether they reflected “a 
refinement, codification, crystallization or progressive development of international law.” 
Id. at 544, 547. Among other things, such labels would “permit[] states more accurately to 
distinguish legal from political solutions.” Id. at 547. 
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It is this last element that I wish to focus on, because, unlike Charney’s 
other selling points, it represented a significant and beguiling inducement for 
sovereigntists. Charney was essentially proposing a grand bargain by which 
states would surrender their right of dissent in exchange for the right to be 
effectively heard. Even if one could not fully agree with the charges of 
authoritarianism and opacity levelled against traditional CIL,90 and even if one 
did not think the proposed trade a fair one,91 the promise of increased clarity 
in any lawmaking enterprise was nothing to be sneezed at. That said, it was 
an empty promise from the beginning and it is vitally important to understand 
why—not merely to settle old academic scores, but because the failure of the 
promise explains much about the nature of contemporary CIL that would 
otherwise be either incomprehensible or underappreciated. 
 
ii. Of Funhouses, Fake Custom, Sheepdogging and Alchemy 
 
Recall that Charney’s main target was treaty-making and the lack of 
universality that often attended it.92 In other words, his target was states that 
did not wish to be bound. How, exactly, would CIL be able to help with this 
situation? In its 1969 opinion in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the 
ICJ had confirmed that a norm-creating provision of a treaty could generate a 
new, identical rule of CIL that would be universally binding.93 The Court 
indicated that if all states having an interest in the provision became parties to 
the treaty, CIL might arise rather easily.94 However, the presence of any hold-
outs would present a very different scenario. In that case, there would be no 
steamrolling. Interested non-party states would become bound only if they, in 
effect, reconsidered their opposition to the norm-creating provision and began 
acting consistently with it out of a sense of legal obligation.95 Such a change 
in disposition was “not lightly to be regarded as having been attained.”96 The 
ICJ’s approach to treaty-based CIL-formation made it unlikely that the kind 
of transparent process of CIL-adoption envisioned by Charney would deliver 
the results he wanted. Why would any state knowingly affirm support for a 
CIL rule that would nullify the choice it had made in rejecting or reserving to 
 
 90 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 91 Stephan questioned early on the conventional belief that increased transparency could 
serve as an adequate substitute for more direct forms of political accountability. See 
Stephan, supra note 20, at 1581-82. 
  92 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
 93 See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 
3, 42 ¶ 71 (Feb. 20). 
 94 See id. at 43, ¶ 73. 
 95 See id. at 44-45, ¶¶  74, 76. 
 96 Id. at 42, ¶ 71. Indeed, the ICJ’s analysis of Germany’s behavior made clear that the 
evidence of the change in disposition would have to be unequivocal. See id. at 45-46, ¶¶ 
77-78. 
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a treaty? Indeed, why would even non-reserving states-parties knowingly 
affirm support for a subsequent, identical CIL rule given that doing so might 
render their treaty-based rights of withdrawal meaningless?97 While Charney 
did not address this clear stumbling block to his proposal and avoided 
discussion of North Sea altogether,98 some otherwise sympathetic 
commentators could not help but acknowledge it,99 and opponents clearly saw 
where things were headed. To paraphrase Prosper Weil, if the new CIL was 
going to succeed in its universality mission, it would have to “cunningly 
outflank,” rather than “frontally assault,” the flexibility mechanisms of 
treaties.100 
Much the same point could be made regarding the second type of work-
product of multilateral fora that Charney hoped would serve as a source of the 
new CIL, viz. instruments, whether formally nonbinding or binding in nature, 
that do not purport to codify or reflect existing CIL. Such instruments grace 
the world under cover of various titles (e.g. “declaration,” “programme of 
action,” “agenda,” “compact,” and “framework”). For ease of reference I shall 
refer to them collectively as “resolutions.” Resolutions express normative 
opinio juris—affirmations that reveal what states believe the law should be. 
They are to be distinguished from instruments that express descriptive opinio 
juris—affirmations that reveal what states believe the law actually is.101 States 
 
 97 Bradley and Gulati support a post-crystallization exit right from CIL partly because it 
would spare states from the “anomaly” of being trapped in a CIL norm that is based on a 
treaty from which withdrawal is possible. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 262-63. 
 98 He did appear to acknowledge the North Sea precedent indirectly when he stated that 
he did not “intend to suggest that all generally applicable treaty texts become ipso facto 
and ab initio customary international law upon adoption or entry into force.” Charney, 
supra note 13, at 547. 
 99 See Roberts, supra note 64, at 768-69 (“It is also not clear that states know that treaties 
will become customary law, or that they wish them to, though this may be changing.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 100 Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 413, 438 (1983). Some commentators might argue that the ICJ’s analysis in North Sea 
was not intended to govern CIL-derivation from treaties seeking to address the kind of 
global problems identified by Charney. They would have something of a point; the Court’s 
language (“specially affected” state interests and the like) makes little sense in the “global 
concern” context. That said, the Court neither expressed nor implied a limitation in the 
application of its rule, and the ILC recently poured cold water on the notion that different 
areas of international law are governed by different subsets of secondary rules. See Draft 
Conclusions, supra note 23, at Conclusion 2, cmt. (6) (describing international law as “a 
single legal system . . . not divided into separate branches with their own approach to 
sources”) (citation omitted). Moreover, if certain “global concern” treaties, such as human 
rights instruments, are indeed “different,” it may be because—as Weisburd argued long 
ago—their typical lack of enforcement and reparations mechanisms warrants the 
assumption that they do not give rise to CIL. See Weisburd, supra note 30, at 23-29. 
 101 See Roberts, supra note 64, at 763-64 (explaining the difference between these two 
types of opinio). For an example of a formally nonbinding expression of descriptive opinio 
juris, see G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law 
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like resolutions because they allow them to signal support for a goal without 
being legally bound to achieve it. Globalists like such instruments because 
their non-threatening “soft” quality can result in greater state participation.102 
However, could states be counted on to knowingly assent to a CIL rule that 
would change the nature of their commitment from a political to a legal one? 
One need only consider states’ spotty track record in agreeing to the 
conversion of their political commitments into legally binding treaty 
obligations to understand that this was far from likely.103 Moreover, the ICJ 
indicated in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons that even an expression of normative opinio juris strong 
enough to border on nascent descriptive opinio juris can fail to give rise to 
CIL if it is stubbornly resisted by a small minority of highly relevant states.104 
This secondary-rule interpretation cast doubt on the very idea of aspiration-
driven, super-majority customary lawmaking in multilateral fora. In doing so, 
it further ensured that stealth, not transparency, would become the tactic of 
necessity in engineering the new universal CIL. 
We can see this stealth at work in what are arguably the two most important 
CIL-formation developments of the last twenty-five years. The first concerns 
the well-documented increase in the number of actors that might legitimately 
bid a CIL norm for consideration by the community of states. While Charney 
had seemed to reserve for state representatives working the halls of IGOs the 
exclusive right to formulate and propose new CIL norms, other scholars were 
not nearly as deferential to state authority on this point. Koh, for example, 
advocated a “transnational legal process” in which the content of new 
international legal norms, both customary and conventional, would be worked 
out in conversations between “norm entrepreneurs” (a collection of nonstate 
actors (NSAs) consisting chiefly of private transnational organizations and 
charismatic individuals) and “governmental norm sponsors” (sympathetic 
 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 102 See Meyer, supra note 62, at 34 (“Soft law, by making obligations nonbinding, may 
ease resistance among dissenting states.”). Of course, soft language that is designed to ease 
national resistance must be distinguished from soft language that is designed to circumvent 
it. I discuss this latter type infra Part I.B. 
 103 Accord Roberts, supra note 64, at 769.  Roberts writes: 
[V]otes in the General Assembly usually receive little media scrutiny and 
are generally not intended to make law. For example, the General 
Assembly resolution on torture was adopted unanimously, while a much 
smaller number of states ratified the Convention Against Torture and 
others entered significant reservations to it. 
Id. 
 104 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226, 255 ¶ 73 (July 8). 
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national government officials).105 Such conversations would generate 
“political solutions” concrete enough to be tabled in any number of “law-
declaring fora,” where they would be further refined, elaborated, and tested 
by an “interpretive community” before being formally presented to the 
community of states for collective consideration.106 The implications of this 
proposed process were at once understated and stunning. Instead of generating 
the relevant state practice through physical acts (traditional CIL), or via the 
activity involved in proposing, debating, and voting on norms in multilateral 
fora (Charney’s new-look CIL), states and their representatives began to be 
cast in the role of mere respondents to norms authored off-stage by an 
assortment of globe-trotting, transnational “others.” 107 
This, to say the least, represented a considerable demotion. It was a 
demotion that became cemented as faith in the virtue and salutary effect of 
NGOs, already frothy in the 1990s,108 bubbled over completely in the early 
2000s,109 leading globalist scholars to offer increasingly bold proposals 
regarding NGO/NSA participation in, and normative significance for, the 
CIL-formation process. A good example in this regard is the work of Monica 
Hakimi. After scrutinizing—and ostensibly criticizing—certain CIL claims 
made by certain NSAs, Hakimi dons the mantle of legal realism to advise her 
fellow scholars to shed their preoccupation with CIL-finding methodology 
and adopt instead the view that many CIL claims are, in whole or in part, pure 
advocacy that should be judged as such (i.e. judged by their success in gaining 
traction within the international community).110 Although Hakimi insists that 
her advice not be taken to mean that “‘anything goes” in CIL,111 it is hard to 
see how it does not mean precisely that given that it paves the way for NSAs 
to become full-fledged norm-makers whose own opinio juris might trump any 
inconsistent state practice not affirmatively supported by a counter-opinio. In 
fact, Hakimi quotes without criticism Jean-Marie Henckaert et al.’s study of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross for just such a proposition: 
 It appears that international courts and tribunals on occasion 
conclude that a rule of customary international law exists when 
the rule is a desirable one . . . for the protection of the human 
 
 105 See Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced? 74 IND. 
L.J. 1397, 1409-10 (1999). 
 106 See id. 
 107 Despite its otherwise conservative approach to CIL-formation, the ILC appears to 
accept the idea of states playing the role of respondents to norms proposed by NSAs and 
private individuals. See Draft Conclusions, supra note 23, at Conclusion 4, cmt. (8). 
 108 See Anderson, supra note 18, at 1264. 
 109 For a description of the many ways NSAs were seeking to become involved in CIL-
formation circa 2001, see Roberts, supra note 64, at 775. 
 110 See Hakimi, supra note 59, at 170-71. 
 111 Id. at 171. 
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person, provided that there is no important contrary opinio 
juris.112  
If this ever were to become accepted practice we would find ourselves well 
beyond the boundary of the rule, controversially laid down by the ICJ in 
Nicaragua v. United States, that uniform and descriptive state opinio juris (not 
NSA opinio) could trump inconsistent practice unsupported by a counter-
opinio.113  
One question sure to arise in such a new legal landscape is whether states 
will need to heed and object to NSA opinio juris in order to preserve their 
right of unilateral CIL-exemption post-crystallization. If they will, we can 
expect to see a significant increase in the monitoring burden placed on 
potential persistent objectors.114 Even if they will not, the already elevated 
status of NSAs as legitimate semi-participants in the arena of CIL-formation 
goes some way toward transforming Louis Henkin’s august “cathedral” of 
international law115 into something more akin to a funhouse, in which norm 
proposals are capable of popping out of any odd nook and cranny. In a world 
in which CIL-finders may just as well be deemed CIL-makers, anything truly 
does go. 
The second major CIL-formation development, somewhat related to this 
first one, has been the frequent resort to ambiguity in presenting the nature of 
the norms that emerge from Koh’s transnational, NSA-dominated 
brainstorming sessions. Charney’s hopes notwithstanding, norm-proposals 
representing lex ferenda have repeatedly been camouflaged in resolutions as 
lex lata.116 This has been done through the use, in some instances, of 
mandatory language,117 and in others of such a tremendous amount of 
regulatory detail and specificity as to deprive proposals of any hortatory 
 
 112 Id. at 169 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted). 
 113 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 207-209 (June 27). 
 114 I discuss the persistent-objector rule in greater detail infra Part I.A.iii. 
 115 It apparently was Koh who attributed this metaphor to Henkin. See Harold Hongju 
Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 
308 (2002). 
 116 As Roberts explained: 
[D]eclarations do not merely photograph or declare the current state of 
practice on moral issues. Rather, they often reflect a deliberate ambiguity 
between actual and desired practice, designed to develop the law and to 
stretch the consensus on the text as far as possible. . . . As a result, 
modern custom often represents progressive development of the law 
masked as codification by phrasing lex ferenda as lex lata. 
Roberts, supra note 64, at 763 (citations omitted). 
 117 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, United Nations Declaration of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007) (providing that states “shall” take effective measures 
to secure a number of the rights identified). 
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feel.118 The effect of such lata packaging is not only, or even principally, to 
“stretch the consensus on the text” (Roberts’s surmise), but to induce enough 
actual implementation of the norm by sympathetic officials at the national 
level to justify a later finding of CIL-formation at the international level. The 
dynamic is at once simple and clever: Lata-esque resolutions are used to 
convey to states strong expectations of desired behavior; once a number of 
states respond positively to these cues, their responsive practice is cited in 
support of a conclusion that a custom has emerged.119 Such custom might best 
be conceptualized as “Fake Custom,” in that international actors instigate, 
through soft-law agreements, the very state practice they later rely on to norm-
declare. In effect, states deliver up the practice they are admonished to deliver 
and then, as their “reward,” they find themselves caught in the webs woven 
of their own good intentions.120 
It does not take a great deal of imagination to see how these two 
developments, as they unfolded together, created an environment in which 
norms could pass into the corpus of CIL without anybody knowing precisely 
how or why they did so. Consider, as an example in this regard, the recently-
concluded Arms Trade Treaty, a multilateral treaty that regulates the 
international trade in conventional weapons.121 As of this writing one hundred 
 
 118 See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 21, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (1992). 
 119 This dynamic was foreshadowed as early as 1962 by the U.N. Secretariat when it 
noted that a General Assembly declaration “may be considered to impart . . . a strong 
expectation that Members of the international community will abide by it. . . . [I]n so far 
as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom 
become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States.” Memorandum of the Office 
of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.610, para. 4, (quoted in 34 U.N. 
ESCOR Supp. (No. 8) at 15, U.N. Doc. E/3614/Rev.1 (1962)). See also Charlesworth, 
supra note 62, at 46. Charlesworth wrote: 
[T]he use of international law in national laws itself contributes to the 
formation of custom. In this way the ‘state practice’ requirement for 
custom can be met through the activities of particular arms of the state, 
such as the judiciary, which may have views that differ markedly from 
those of the executive or legislative branches. 
Id. 
 120 Koh essentially described Fake Custom when he wrote: 
A state-to-state process account simply does not capture the full picture 
of how international human rights norms are currently generated, brought 
into domestic systems, and then brought back up to the international 
level. . . . Once again, an international law norm trickled down, was 
internalized, and bubbled back up into new international law. 
Koh, supra note 105, at 1412, 1414. 
 121 Final U.N. Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty: Draft Decision, art. 1, Mar. 27, 
2013, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.217/2013.L.3. On April 2, 2013, the U.N. General Assembly 
passed a resolution adopting the treaty as contained in the annex to the draft declaration 
and recommending that nations join the treaty. G.A. Res. 67/234, Arms Trade Treaty (Apr. 
2, 2013) [hereinafter ATT]. 
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states have ratified the ATT, a modest number that does not include major 
arms-exporting countries like China, Russia and the United States.122 Despite 
the fact that the ATT’s prohibitions and constraints on state action had no 
basis in pre-existing CIL,123 civil society activists began claiming, even prior 
to the treaty’s entry into force in 2014, that it would soon give rise to identical 
CIL norms that would be binding on non-party states.124 Precisely how CIL 
would arise to accomplish this feat of coercion the activists did not say.125 But 
one can be forgiven for thinking that their own advocacy and self-appointed 
role in monitoring treaty implementation,126 combined with the growing 
campaign to cast gun violence as a human-rights issue,127 will have something 
to do with it. To call this process of CIL-formation “little-understood,” as 
Bradley and Goldsmith did in the late 1990s,128 was a kind understatement. 
 
 122 Arms Trade Treaty Status, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un. 
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVI-8&chapter=26&clang=_en 
(last updated Oct. 02, 2019). 
 123 See Anna MacDonald, UN Arms Trade Treaty Can Save Many Lives – If It Is Robustly 
Enforced, GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2014) https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ 
poverty-matters/2014/sep/25/un-arms-trade-treaty-exports-sales (“This treaty demands a 
radical shift in behaviour by the major arms exporters who must lead the way in 
demonstrating a new sense of responsibility when it comes to trading in arms.”). 
 124 MacDonald writes: 
Once the treaty enters into force and becomes binding international law, 
it will create a strong deterrent for all countries – even those not a party 
to it – to end uncontrolled arms transfers. It has happened before, for 
example, following the development of the mine ban treaty and it will 
happen again. A comprehensive treaty will help accelerate and develop 
a specific international norm which, over time, simply cannot be ignored. 
Id. 
 125 See id. 
 126 The umbrella NGO behind the ATT (Control Arms) has vowed that “civil society will 
closely monitor implementation of the Treaty, and press their national governments to 
produce and to make public the most comprehensive national reports possible.” Control 
Arms, Summary Analysis of the Arms Trade Treaty, SAFER WORLD (May 2013), 
https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/737-summary-analysis-of-the-
arms-trade-treaty. 
 127 The NGOs have taken the lead in this campaign. See, e.g., Lois Beckett, ‘A Human 
Rights Crisis’: US Accused of Failing to Protect Citizens from Gun Violence, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/12/us-gun-control-hum 
an-rights-amnesty-international. But scholars are not far behind. See, e.g., Interdisciplinary 
and Human Rights Approaches to the Gun Violence Crisis in the United States, WASH. 
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW (Nov. 2, 2018), https://publichealth.wustl.edu/events/interdisciplinary- 
and-human-rights-approaches-to-the-gun-violence-crisis-in-the-united-states/. 
  One tactical advantage for globalists in dressing policy goals like stricter gun 
regulation in the garb of “human rights” is that state exemption from any prohibitive norms 
that develop may become more difficult. See GREEN, supra note 41, at 208-25 (exploring 
the view that persistent objection is not available apropos norms of customary international 
human rights law deemed “fundamental” but not jus cogens). 
 128 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 328. 
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To call the process “greatly under-analyzed,” which they also did,129 was a 
syntactical error, for it lends itself to analysis about as much as legislative 
horse-trading in the proverbial dark-and-smoke-filled back room. I myself 
propose the function-focused term “sheepdogging” to describe CIL’s activity 
in this context, as CIL mimics a sheepdog in the way it rounds up wayward 
treaty-refusers and reservers and gets them into the treaty corral. James Green 
has recently given this surprisingly candid example of sheepdogging: 
[N]ot all states are parties to the Ottawa Convention on 
antipersonnel landmines (APLM), but there are strong 
indications that an equivalent customary ban is evolving, if it 
has not already evolved. This prohibition, of course, catches 
(or will catch) any remaining dissident states that have not 
already gained exemption through prior persistent 
objection.130 
In addition to the ATT we might also consider the recently concluded 
“Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” which by its own 
terms presents a “non-legally binding cooperative framework” 131 (i.e. a set of 
aspirational/political commitments) on the subject of migration. In a 2018 
interview in which he urged his government to reject the Compact, the leader 
of the opposition party in New Zealand (Simon Bridges) appeared resigned to 
the inevitability of the Compact’s commitments eventually hardening into 
law. His choice of words was revealing: 
[The Compact] is creating a situation where we know even if 
it is not binding, over time it will become part of our laws, it 
will become interpreted by the judiciary. We don’t need to do 
that. What part of our settings is wrong in immigration and 
why would we cede this?132 
Exactly what the “situation” was that Bridges was referring to is unclear, 
and I suspect that not even he could describe it with any precision. But two 
things are clear: (1) Whatever the nature of the “situation” might be, it is 
unlikely to resemble anything like the formal, legislative-like process 
 
 129 Id. 
 130 GREEN, supra note 42, at 149 (citations omitted). 
 131 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (July 11, 2018), ¶ 7, 
https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/migration.pdf 
[hereinafter Global Migration Compact or Compact]. 
 132 Simon Bridges on UN Migration Pact: We Already Have ‘Good, if Not Excellent’ 
Immigration Policy, RADIO NZ (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/ 
377887/simon-bridges-on-un-migration-pact-we-already-have-good-if-not-excellent-imm 
igration-policy. 
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envisioned by Charney; and (2) Bridges’s sense of inevitability is fully 
justified by history. He undoubtedly would have been aware of the significant 
effort his country had to make in order to avoid becoming legally bound by 
the aspirational provisions of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.133 He also presumably would have known of the United 
States’ bruising experience in trying to remain legally free of the economic 
and social-rights provisions of the UDHR. In this latter case, it was not enough 
for the United States to successfully lobby for and secure what everyone 
agrees was a purely hortatory instrument at its inception.134 Nor was it enough 
for the United States to decline to ratify the treaty that was eventually crafted 
to offer these provisions in legally binding form (the ICESCR). No, in the 
eyes of many—excluding, perhaps, Messrs. Puras and Alston—the United 
States has succeeded in remaining free of the legal obligation to comply with 
these provisions only because it has taken the additional step of persistently 
objecting to them.135 Notice how the burden has been shifted onto treaty-
rejecters to prove to the satisfaction of the international community that they 
well and truly wish to remain free of a treaty norm. The sovereignty-
respecting “opt in if you’d like” spirit of North Sea has been imperceptibly 
transformed into an “opt out if you dare and can” warning. 
These examples, though few in number, illustrate what may be the ultimate 
moral of the “new CIL” story, which is that in many instances the absorption 
into CIL of hortatory norms and purely conventional obligations has become 
a foregone conclusion. Absorption simply will occur via an opaque, 
alchemical process that evinces no particular methodology other than the “by-
hook-or-by-crook” kind.136 Perhaps Hakimi was right after all (at least in her 
descriptive intuitions): Modern CIL-formation really does seem to come down 
 
 133 Similar efforts were made by Australia, Canada and the United States. See GREEN, 
supra note 42, at 232-33. 
 134 See Charlesworth, supra note 58, at ¶ 7 (“[T]he US supported the idea of a declaration 
of principles whose force would be primarily moral”); Hurst Hannum, The Status of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 287, 317 (1995) (“It is, of course, unanimously agreed that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was not viewed as imposing legal obligations on states at the 
time of its adoption by the General Assembly in 1948.”). 
 135 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 102-03, 102 n.73, 180-81 (confirming consensus that 
U.S. qualifies as persistent objector to UDHR- and ICESCR-based CIL right to adequate 
food). 
 136 Weil foresaw this development with his characteristic blend of insight and dread: 
[T]he intention manifested by a state in regard to a given convention is 
henceforth of little account: whether it signs it or not, becomes party to 
it or not, enters reservations to such and such a clause or not, it will in 
any case be bound by any provisions of the convention that are 
recognized to possess the character of rules of customary or general 
international law. 
Weil, supra note 100, at 440 (emphasis added). 
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to the force of advocacy, with NGO-generated media-buzz and spin counting 
as an important factor. Indeed, I would go so far as to suggest that, from a 
methodological standpoint, the only truly debatable question that remains for 
contemporary CIL is whether states have taken the steps needed to secure 
exemption via persistent objection from its near-inevitable rule-formation. 
Again, the shifting of the burden should be more than clear. 
 
iii. Persistent Objectors Need Not Apply 
 
And it is here where the rubber finally meets the road, for in the hands of 
globalist scholars this burden has become virtually impossible to meet. James 
Green’s recent well-received study137 argues in favor of recognizing several 
severe attributes of modern persistent objection. First, states must monitor and 
be prepared to object to virtually any instrument that comes out of a 
multilateral forum, and they must do so even if they have previously lodged a 
formal rejection of or reservation to the instrument.138 In so far as treaties and 
resolutions are concerned, this persistency requirement means that a state’s 
formal decision to withhold its consent from an instrument, or to reserve to a 
part thereof, is just the beginning of its involvement with the instrument, not—
as might reasonably be expected—the end. This, again, flips the logic of North 
Sea. Second, given the rapidity with which the new CIL can form,139 and the 
claimed unavailability of objection post-crystallization,140 states may have a 
very small temporal window in which to make their objections known.141 
Third, in addition to expressing their objection persistently, states must refrain 
from any action or statement, including “acts” of pregnant silence, which 
might be construed as being inconsistent with their objection.142 Fourth and 
finally, once an exemption is legally secured, a state will nonetheless forfeit 
it if at any time post-crystallization it ceases voicing its opposition to the 
norm.143 
 
 137 See GREEN, supra note 42. The study won the 2017 Book Prize of the European 
Society of International Law. 2017 ESIL Book Prize, ESIL, https://esil-sedi.eu/2017-esil-
book-prize/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
 138 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 85-87. 
 139 Charney touted this rapidity and predicted that two major resolutions that had been 
adopted shortly before the publication of his article–the 1992 Agenda 21 and the 1993 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action–would birth new CIL in short order. See 
Charney, supra note 13, at 549. 
 140 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 135-53. I address this claim infra note 160. 
 141 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 153-62, 170-73. 
 142 See id. at 116-30. Whether he intends to or not, Green gives the impression of pro-
norm state representatives and NGO activists prowling the halls of multilateral conferences 
looking to document any small slip-of-the-tongue or failure-to-speak by anti-norm 
representatives. 
 143 See id. at 182-84. 
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Neither logic nor consistency of principle can explain this draconian set of 
rules.144 As even Sohn acknowledged, logic would seem to dictate that the 
easier it becomes for international actors to form CIL, the easier it should be 
for states to exercise their right of unilateral exemption.145 Logic dictates that 
as the procedural normativity of CIL dims and the possibility of genuine ex 
ante state voice declines,146 the opportunity for ex post state exit should 
expand.147 Logic dictates that as CIL (and international law in general) 
increasingly concerns itself with matters traditionally lying within states’ 
domestic jurisdictions, and as an increasing number of states adopt the 
democratic form, exemption should become easier, not harder.148 Logic 
dictates that states should enjoy roughly the same subsequent unilateral 
withdrawal rights from CIL that they enjoy from treaties.149 Finally, logic 
dictates the limits of the claim that a narrow-exemption rule is needed across 
all areas of international law in order to protect states’ reliance interests.150 
How, for example, are France’s legitimate expectations even remotely upset, 
or its need for confidence in the stability of the international legal environment 
even remotely frustrated, by the fact that the United States, or any other 
country, seeks exemption from a human rights norm? Green does not tell us, 
and for good reason. They are not.151 
 
 144 Green himself describes the rules as “onerous.” Id. at 246. The ILC describes them as 
“stringent.” See Draft Conclusions, supra note 23, at Conclusion 15, cmt. (1). 
 145 See Sohn, supra note 17, at 1080 (“[T]he easier it becomes to develop new principles 
and rules of international law, the more a safety valve is needed to safeguard national 
sovereignty and vital state interests.”). 
 146 See supra Part I.A.ii. 
 147 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 242-44. 
 148 Like Charney before him, Green ignores the reality of democratic politics at the 
national level and fails to consider its implications for his analysis. He assumes, for 
example, that when a state seeks to alter its stance toward an existing CIL norm, it does so 
for unprincipled and opportunistic reasons rather than because a majority of its citizens, 
via participation in the electoral process, have exercised their sovereign right to change 
their collective mind and reorient national policy around a new norm. See GREEN, supra 
note 42, at 131. 
 149 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 204-05, 270-75. 
 150 Green makes this claim repeatedly throughout his analysis. See, e.g., GREEN, supra 
note 42, at 145-47. 
 151 Charney claimed that certain gross violations of human rights (such as apartheid and 
genocide) that are committed within a single state “might threaten international peace and 
security worldwide.” Charney, supra note 13, at 530. Fair enough; one could grant him this 
point even though he chose to assert it rather than argue it. However, the claim’s 
plausibility does not easily extend to less systemic violations of human rights, such as, 
allegedly, the use of the juvenile death penalty. If the rehabilitation of youthful offenders 
is an “object[] of international concern,” it is not because one state is directly affected by 
another state’s judgment on the issue, but because all states must, in the course of their 
own self-administration, render a judgment. Id. Globalist scholars and officials muddy the 
intellectual waters when they conflate common or shared problems, in the latter sense, with 
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As for consistency of principle—or more precisely, lack thereof—it would 
take a small article in its own right to fully explore the double standards that 
animate Green’s analysis. Here is a brief summary of the main ones: 
• States need not publicly affirm their desire to continue enjoying 
their rights under treaty in order to maintain them. Rather, treaty 
rights are deemed extinguished (via the process of desuetude) only 
if a state fails to exercise its right for an extended period of time 
and/or fails to protest physical conduct that violates or interferes 
with the right. Why, then, should mere post-crystallization 
silence, pregnant or otherwise, be enough to work a forfeiture of 
an established right of CIL-exemption? 
• In the human-rights context, lack of objection is typically not 
deemed acquiescence in the formation of permissive norms,152 yet 
it typically is deemed behavior sufficiently indicative of 
acquiescence to defeat a later claim of exemption from prohibitive 
norms. How is it that a state can “object without objecting” in the 
former context but not in the latter? 
• In attacking the procedural normativity of classical CIL-
formation, scholars have made much of the fact that smaller states 
lacked the resources to keep track of all norms bid by wealthier 
and more powerful states through their physical state practice.153 
However, when it comes to protecting smaller states’ ability to 
keep track of bid norms for the purpose of timely objection, 
scholars tend to show no such concern. Green, for example, takes 
no issue with the fact that under the current set of rules “even the 
most vigilant state may still find that its objections come too 
late.”154 
• It is widely understood and accepted that CIL can be not only 
shockingly indeterminate in its formation but also messily 
unstable in its evolution. Making new CIL can often be done only 
by violating old CIL; and states that grow dissatisfied with an 
existing CIL norm, but lack the numbers to change it, can still opt 
out of it via treaty (provided the rule is not jus cogens). Yet when 
it comes to arguing for a narrow exemption for persistent 
objectors, scholars like Green rather suddenly awaken to a grave 
need for certainty and stability within the CIL realm.155 
 
externalized ones requiring international regulation and enforcement. Accord Anderson, 
supra note 18, at 1305. 
 152 See Roberts, supra note 64, at 778. 
 153 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 154 GREEN, supra note 42, at 278 (emphasis added). 
 155 See id. at 148, 153. 
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• Charney proposed that “one clearly phrased and strongly 
endorsed declaration at a near-universal diplomatic forum could 
be sufficient to establish new international law.”156 If that is so 
then it is reasonable to ask why one clearly phrased and strongly 
endorsed objection should not be enough to establish an 
exemption from such international law. To his credit, Green 
hedges slightly in claiming that persistency is needed to ensure 
adequate notice to other states.157 He appears to value the 
persistency criterion mostly for the enriching effect it can have on 
interstate discourse.158 Tellingly, however, he offers no evidence 
to suggest that discourse will fail to take place unless it is legally 
incentivized. 
Green would be hard-pressed to deny the result-oriented nature of his 
analysis given that, in his more candid moments, he all but admits that the 
goal is to build out the power of the international legal system, not infuse it 
with principle. The rules, he writes, are designed to force dissenting states to 
remain at the table of norm-discussion until, essentially, they fold.159 
Subsequent objection and withdrawal cannot be tolerated because, if they 
were, CIL would be disabled from performing its critical sheepdog function 
of binding non-states-parties to treaty norms.160 This is why rational choice-
 
 156 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 157 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 277 (“The need for persistence tests the will of the 
objector to ensure that the rule is not used frivolously and, at least to an extent, promotes 
clarity and certainty”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 158 See id. at 269-70. 
 159 See id. at 97, 105, 126. 
 160 See id. at 149. Green argues that the rule disallowing subsequent objection can be 
derived from state practice, citing two cases in the post-World War II era in which 
subsequent objection was attempted and failed. See id. at 140-43. But neither case supports 
his position. In Case 1 the failure of the equatorial states to exempt themselves from a rule 
permitting the geostationary orbit of satellites foundered in significant part on the fact that 
most of the objecting states were parties to a treaty (the Outer Space Treaty of 1967) that 
forbade the very territorial claims they were trying to protect via objection. It is far from 
clear that the rejection of the objectors’ position would have been as universal as it was 
had pro-custom treaty law not been involved. In Case 2, France was not claiming a right 
of exemption from the pre-existing CIL relating to treaty interpretation, but just the 
opposite: France contended that it was bound by that pre-existing CIL rather than by 
similar, but allegedly non-identical, provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, to which it was not a party. Notably, when the ILC restated the persistent-objector 
rule in 2015, it did not adduce any precedential state practice, relying instead on a single 
line of dicta from the North Sea decision. See Draft Conclusions, supra note 23, at 
Conclusion 15, cmts. (1) & (5). 
  Green makes much of the fact that states do not tend to invoke the right of subsequent 
objection. Yet, he concedes that many states would readily do so if they thought they could. 
See GREEN, supra note 42, at 140, 150. The question is: Why don’t they think they can? 
Green is not especially curious on this point, but he should be. States are likely deterred by 
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inspired analyses of the persistent-objector rule, to which Green is otherwise 
sympathetic,161 make so little headway with him when it comes to some of 
their discrete findings—most notably their conclusion that the availability of 
subsequent objection and exit would strengthen international law, not weaken 
it.162 As any good systems analyst knows, strengthening a system is not the 
same as tightening it. Since Green’s and the globalists’ priority is tightening, 
strengthening holds relatively little attraction for them.163 
In one sense it may be unfair to single Green out for criticism, as there are 
scholars who are far less sympathetic to the persistent-objector rule than he. 
Some scholars, for example, reject the de jure nature of the exemption 
altogether.164 Others advance ideas that have the effect of drastically lessening 
the rule’s utility, such as that of “accelerated custom,” which collapses the 
temporal window for objecting,165 and of “fundamental” norms, which 
allegedly share with jus cogens the happy quality of being immune to 
objection.166 To his credit Green rejects each of these moves.167 That said, his 
work shows just how unfriendly toward sovereignty-rights even the milder 
works of globalist scholarship can be. Further, there is no denying that Green’s 
approach does reflect mainstream scholarly opinion on the subject of 
persistent objection.168 The upshot, therefore, is a contemporary CIL that is 
arguably every bit as coercive as Charney had hoped, minus the charm of 
transparency.  
Indeed, engineering universal compliance with norms expressed in treaties 
and resolutions seems to be CIL’s main role these days, as it rarely generates 
the content of first-order rules on its own. The twentieth-century phenomenon 
 
the fact that “the considerable majority of scholars”—a group that includes Green 
himself—”reject the notion of subsequent objection.” Id. at 140. 
 161 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 257-60. 
 162 See, e.g., Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 241-75; Guzman, supra note 64, at 164-
72. 
 163 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 278. Green writes: 
Providing states with an ‘opt-out’ from emerging norms of customary 
international law has its systematic benefits, but there is no reason to 
make it easy for the objector: the dice are, and should be, loaded in favour 
of the majority. 
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Green’s preference here is undoubtedly 
motivated by his belief—more asserted than argued—that universalism “has a greater 
overall utility” than a system characterized by permissible state deviation. Id. at 259. 
 164 See id. at 5 n.27 (citing these scholars). 
 165 See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law, 
20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 305 (2013). 
 166 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 210 n.8 (citing scholars who promote this idea). 
 167 See id. at 55, 173, 224. 
 168 It is also consistent with the ILC’s recent restatement of the rule, especially as regards 
the unavailability of subsequent objection and the requirement that objection continue to 
be voiced after the point at which an exemption has been legally secured. See Draft 
Conclusions, supra note 23, at Conclusion 15, cmts. (5) & (9). 
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known as the “CIL of the gaps” is fast disappearing. It is hard to imagine any 
issue on which true physical state practice stands a chance of beating 
international-conference-cooperative-frameworking to the punch—
excepting, of course, those rare instances in which physical state practice 
actually serves globalist purposes. Rebecca Crootof, for example, has recently 
urged the recognition of the dominance of practice-based CIL in cases where 
a state or group of states seek to modify, through their behavior, the terms of 
a multilateral treaty against the wishes of states counter-parties.169 Crootof 
touts her proposal as “radical”170 and I sadly must agree, for it does represent 
a new and unusual example of the doctrinal weaponization of CIL against 
treaties. 
Yet for all of contemporary CIL’s coercive mission and effect one 
important caveat must be lodged, and that is that coercive power should not 
be mistaken for enforcement power, nor even for enforcement pretensions. 
For the most part, contemporary CIL is content to form as a theoretical matter 
and then stop, leaving the prosaic and sometimes bitter work of enforcement 
to sympathetic national officials (viz. the janus-faced judges and bureaucrats 
who man the vertical networks that feature so prominently in the works of 
Koh171 and like-minded political scientist Anne Marie Slaughter172). One 
wonders, in this vein, whether Puras and Alston even cared whether their 
statements accurately reflected international law. Their obvious common 
audience was not the international but the American one; their obvious 
common goal, not to lay the groundwork for hauling the United States before 
an international tribunal, but to make claims colorable enough to serve as 
ammunition for domestic allies seeking to align national law with 
international standards. The Washington Post reporter who broke the story of 
the Puras Letter seems to have appreciated this very point, writing: 
Though of questionable legal value, the U.N. letter is at least a 
bit of moral support for those defending Obamacare. Those 
attempting to deny health care to tens of millions of Americans 
 
 169 See Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary International Law 
Modifies Treaties, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 237 (2016). 
 170 Id. at 286. 
 171 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN. ST. INT’L 
L. REV. 745 (2006); Koh, supra note 105; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal 
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996); see also Koh, supra note 19, at 361 (“I long ago 
described a pervasive phenomenon in international affairs that I call ‘transnational legal 
process,’ which holds that international law is primarily enforced not by coercion, but by 
a process of internalized compliance.”) (emphasis in original). 
 172 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
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would hurt their own constituents in a way that falls short of 
the standards we hold for ourselves and other countries.173 
This globalist strategy of eschewing the overt and external imposition of 
international law in favor of its more subtle internalization via elements of the 
“disaggregated state” 174 has two important implications. First, it goes a good 
way toward rendering irrelevant the long-debated concern about the 
compliance deficit at the heart of the international order, as that concern rests 
in significant part on an assumption of unitary states uncompromised from 
within.175 Second, the strategy marginalizes, and in so doing neutralizes, the 
more conservative approach to CIL-formation taken by the ICJ and, to a lesser 
extent, the ILC. This is because the success of internalization depends not on 
what international law is authoritatively declared to be by international 
institutions, but on what it is plausibly portrayed as being by key domestic 
actors speaking to domestic audiences. I shall address the work of these 
domestic actors in some detail in Part II of this Article. 
 
B. Retooling Treaties to Cure Their Own Mischief 
 
The previous section examined how globalist legal scholars have sought 
to refashion CIL into a tool for indirectly undermining the consensual nature 
of treaty obligations. However, in recent years their attack on treaties has 
become more direct and frontal (to paraphrase Weil). They have not only 
employed several strategies for making international agreements themselves 
as sticky as possible, but have sought to work a subtle reconceptualization of 
the very nature of conventional commitment in order to insulate agreements 
from any “reactionary” forces of change that might emerge at the domestic 
level. 
 
i. The Government Is Dead. Long Live Its International Commitments! 
 
Let’s begin with the reworking of the treaty concept, for it is the bolder 
and more ambitious of the two phenomena. When President Trump entered 
office, he announced his intention to end U.S. participation in the Paris 
Climate Change Agreement, the Iran Nuclear Agreement, the Trans-Pacific 
 
 173 Milbank, supra note 8. 
 174 Slaughter originated this term in opposition to what she considered to be the fiction 
of unitary statehood. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 172, at 12-13. 
 175 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005); Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between 
International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 193 (1980). 
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Partnership, and the North American Free Trade Agreement.176 Globalist 
scholars and commentators were predictably appalled, and there ensued “a 
flurry of scholarship examining presidential power to withdraw from 
international commitments.”177 The most intriguing rhetorical device used to 
impugn the integrity of the Trump Administration’s plans was the suggestion 
that treaties do not represent binding commitments unless and until withdrawn 
from (the traditional view), but rather eternal commitments on the part of a 
state which hover above the realm of its politics. This suggestion lurked in 
Koh’s combative declaration in a 2017 article that, “[u]nlike Trump’s, 
America’s commitment to fighting climate change is irreversible,”178 as well 
as in Tess Bridgeman’s warning that “[i]f the United States cannot be counted 
on to carry out our commitments when the Presidency changes political 
parties, it will erode trust in future Presidents of any political party to enter 
into agreements with partners.”179 The suggestion was advanced more directly 
by French President Emmanuel Macron, who in the run-up to the 2018 G-7 
meeting in Canada told the press: 
None of us who have been elected by the people can say ‘all 
prior commitments disappear.’ It’s just not true, there is a 
continuity in state affairs at the heart of international laws. 
Sometimes we’ve inherited some commitments that weren’t 
core to our beliefs, but we stuck to them, because that is how 
it works for nations. And that will be the case for the United 
States—like for every great democracy.180 
By weaving notions of permanence and immutability into the fabric of 
conventional obligation, globalists have been able to defend a highly specific 
substantive-law status quo under the guise of defending “the rules-based, 
interconnected international order.”181 If commitments contained in 
 
 176 See Catherine Amirfar & Ashika Singh, The Trump Administration and the 
‘Unmaking’ of International Agreements, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 443 (2018). 
 177 Id. 
 178 Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law, 56 
WASHBURN L.J. 413, 436 (2017). 
 179 Tess Bridgeman, Paris Is a Binding Agreement: Here’s Why That Matters, JUST 
SECURITY (June 4, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/41705/paris-binding-agreement-m 
atters/. 
 180 Tyler Durden, “The Old Order Is Over”: Trump To “Confront” G-7 As Macron Plans 
On “Standing Up” To US President, ZEROHEDGE (June 7, 2018), https://www.zerohedg 
e.com/news/2018-06-07/trump-plans-adopting-confrontational-tone-g-7-response-g-6-pre 
ssure. 
 181 Amirfar & Singh, supra note 176, at 443; see also id. at 459 (“[I]f our foreign partners 
feel that they can no longer rely upon the United States . . . to keep its international 
commitments, the foundations of that order are threatened”); Koh, supra note 178, at 418 
120 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L [Vol. 48:85 
international agreements are “meant” to be fixed and stable, then withdrawing 
from such agreements necessarily equates to “gratuitously break[ing]” 
international law182 and taking a box cutter to rule of law values.183 This is 
apparently the case even if withdrawal is attempted in accordance with a 
treaty’s own terms (e.g. the Paris Agreement), and even if the entire agreement 
was expressly concluded as a nonbinding political commitment (e.g. the Iran 
Nuclear Agreement).184 On this logic, a new leader’s rejection of a previous 
leader’s responses to complex international regulatory challenges is as lawless 
as a declaration of intent to wage aggressive war; in either case the new leader 
is threatening the “universal rights . . . that form much of the foundation of 
modern international law.”185 And since no sane and balanced person would 
issue such a threat, much less act on it, any leader who does do so, namely 
President Trump, must suffer from some type of psychological disorder. 
Nativist tendencies? Undoubtedly.186 A mercurial and capricious 
temperament? Very likely.187 A will-to-power188 that must be resisted189 at all 
costs? Most certainly. 
But whose temperament and judgment are questionable here? I suggest not 
the President’s. Surely the globalist commentators cited above would, in their 
calmer moments, concede that treaty commitments—even ones reflecting 
core principles of international public policy, such as the Geneva Conventions 
and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—are generally deemed revocable, 
 
(suggesting that nations that do not adhere to “existing, recognizable legal frameworks” 
act “based on power or expedience alone”). 
 182 Koh, supra note 178, at 419. 
 183 See Amirfar & Singh, supra note 176, at 459 (implying that Trump’s decisions to 
terminate U.S. involvement in Obama-era agreements herald “a return to a global order 
that is a Hobbesian free-for-all, where power is the only arbiter”); Koh, supra note 178, at 
420 (“The Trump approach . . . claims that there are no rules that bind our conduct.”). 
 184 See KENNETH KATZMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44942 U.S. DECISION TO 
CEASE IMPLEMENTING THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nu 
ke/R44942 (“[O]fficials in the Obama Administration asserted that the JPCOA is a 
nonbinding political commitment, and Trump Administration officials continued that 
assertion.”) (citation omitted). 
 185 Koh, supra note 178, at 420. 
 186 See Amirfar & Singh, supra note 176, at 443 (claiming the Trump Administration is 
motivated by a desire “to scrub the U.S. body politic clean of what it appears to view as 
pesky ‘foreign’ entanglements”). 
 187 See id. at 459 (implying that Trump’s withdrawal decisions were “born not from a 
genuine response to changed conditions, but from arbitrary and capricious impulse.”); Koh, 
supra note 178, at 420 (describing Trump as “mercurial”). 
 188 See Koh, supra note 178, at 419 (describing Trump as a “willful president arriving at 
the White House with a self-proclaimed radical agenda to change how America engages 
the world.”). 
 189 See id. at 442 (“The main message is that the Trump Administration does not own our 
climate policy. We all do. . . . There are many resisters, and many ways to resist”). 
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not eternal.190 And they are deemed revocable for one simple and compelling 
reason: They serve a state’s self-interests, perceptions of which can change. 
Indeed, treaty-making has traditionally been understood as an exercise in what 
Anderson calls “sovereign state multilateralism,”191 a process of horizontal 
interaction in which the extent, type, and duration of multilateral cooperation 
rests, ultimately, within each state’s judgment.192 To suggest that treaties 
represent instead a type of irrevocable Hobbesian social contract, or that a 
state acts lawlessly in availing itself of express or implied exit rights, or that 
the rule of law brooks no changes of mind or of course, is essentially to say 
that nation-states and their citizenries exist to serve the international order, not 
the other way around. The problem with that proposition is, I think, obvious. 
Additionally, there is the pesky issue of democracy when treaty 
withdrawal is motivated—as it can be in a democracy—not by a change in 
material external circumstances but in the internal distribution of political 
power. While campaigning for the presidency in 2016, President Trump made 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement an important campaign pledge.193 
While his solid victory in the Electoral College (his 306 votes to Clinton’s 
232194) concededly cannot be interpreted as a mandate on any specific 
platform plank, it did lend his subsequent withdrawal decision substantial 
democratic legitimacy—more than enough, I should think, to take it out of the 
category of Dauphin-esque whim that some globalists would cast it in.195 
While I do not doubt the sincerity of globalists’ belief that President Trump’s 
 
 190 This is evidenced by both the widespread use of express withdrawal clauses and the 
fairly routine recognition of implied rights of withdrawal based on treaty subject matter. 
See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 204. 
 191 See Anderson, supra note 18, at 1262. 
 192 Sovereign state multilateralism reflects Kant’s vision of global governance, viz. a law 
of nations founded on a federation of free states interacting with each other on the basis of 
shared assessments of mutual interests. See IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795). Koh invokes Kant against the Trump Administration. See 
Koh, supra note 178, at 466-67. But unless Kant can be read as endorsing an international 
hive mind, this invocation is inapt. 
 193 See Jamie Fly, Trump’s Unsurprising Rejection of the Paris Climate Agreement (June 
5, 2017), http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2017/06/05/trumps-unsurprising-rejection-paris-cli 
mate-agreement (“As a candidate, Trump was very clear on the campaign trail about his 
intention to scrap the agreement. The Republican platform in Cleveland last summer was 
explicit as well”); Koh, supra note 19, at 355 (“During the 2016 presidential campaign, 
President-Elect Donald Trump promised to ‘cancel’ the Paris Agreement.”) (citation 
omitted). 
   194 Presidential Election Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES,  
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president (last updated Aug. 9, 2017, 
9:00 AM). 
 195 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 178, at 442 (“The environmental community and the global 
commitment to clean energy are far bigger than Donald Trump.”); id. at 465 (“A new 
president cannot simply have his way.”). 
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withdrawal decision disserves the national interest,196 it would seem that an 
election-winning percentage of United States voters disagreed with that 
assessment. Surely it is their judgment that matters and that deserves respect, 
is it not?197 
 
ii. Word Games, Calendar Chicanery and Other Shenanigans 
 
When not trying to replace the traditional concept of the treaty with 
something more philosophically radical, globalist scholars and their allies 
have resorted to a host of gimmicks and tricks designed to make international 
agreements stickier (i.e. easier for states to enter and harder to leave). 
Regarding ease of entry, the key tactic has been circumvention of those 
national authorities—usually the legislature—that tend to be skeptical of 
international commitment. In recent years circumvention has been attempted 
in several different ways. One has been to couch the most consequential 
provisions of an agreement in non-mandatory language (e.g. replacing 
“shalls” with “shoulds”). This allows characterization of an agreement as a 
mere political/diplomatic commitment on the part of a state by its executive, 
not a legally binding, contractual obligation requiring legislative approval.198 
A second way has been to use two articles of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties199—Articles 18 and 25—to procure state compliance with 
treaty provisions at the point of executive signature instead of legislative 
ratification. Article 18 has been used as a stick,200 Article 25 as a carrot,201 
 
 196 See, e.g., Amirfar & Singh, supra note 176, at 443. 
 197 In this vein, President Macron might wish to reconsider the advisability of invoking 
the concept of democracy to criticize a democratically-blessed geostrategic decision. 
 198 See Koh, supra note 19, at 346. Koh writes: 
If the international commitment being assumed is only political, and 
neither new, legally binding, nor domestically enforceable, the 
obligations being created are diplomatic, not contractual, and can 
lawfully be made by the President alone, operating against a broad 
background of legislative acceptance . . . . 
Id. The wording of the emissions-cap provisions in the Paris Agreement exemplifies this 
strategic use of language. See Bridgeman, supra note 179 (“The Paris Agreement, having 
been carefully negotiated by experienced actors over an extended time period, is certainly 
an example of such exacting scrutiny in the choice of words.”); Koh, supra note 19, at 352. 
 199 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]. 
 200 Article 18 states that a nation that signs a treaty is “obliged to refrain from acts which 
would defeat the object and purpose” of the treaty “until it shall have made its intention 
clear not to become a party to the treaty.” Id. art. 18. Puras invoked Article 18 in arguing 
that the United States is legally bound to secure to its citizens the rights enumerated in the 
ICESCR. See Puras Letter, supra note 1, at 3. For a discussion of some of the scholarship 
that supports Puras’s position, see Bradley, supra note 44, at 315-16. 
 201 Article 25(1) permits nations “to have a treaty apply provisionally even before they 
have ratified it—for example, based on a provision in the treaty that is triggered by 
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and each to the same effect: reducing the act of ratification vel non to the status 
of either a quasi-formality at best202 or a nullity at worst.203 Yet a third way 
has been to ignore any “inconvenient” understandings that a national 
legislature may have regarding the nature of the treaty commitments it does 
agree to adopt. Alston went down this road when he interpreted the CERD as 
declaring socio-economic rights instead of simply prohibiting discrimination 
relative to their optional exercise.204 Puras went down it as well when he 
advanced, as against the Trump Administration’s Obamacare-repeal plans, a 
disparate-impact claim based on the CERD205 that the ratifying Senate had 
expressly discountenanced.206 Each of these three ways of circumventing the 
national legislature is problematic, and it behooves us to pause and consider 
precisely why. 
The calculated use of non-mandatory language has been billed as a way to 
increase state participation in international agreements. Bridgeman write 
apropos the Paris Agreement: “[A]llowing parties to set their own emissions 
targets was intended to encourage broad participation among states and 
incentivize maximum ambition.”207 But framing the matter this way 
obfuscates more than it clarifies, for it ignores the crucial issue of whether 
 
signature, or in a separate agreement.” Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1238. 
Article 25(2) provides for the termination of this provisional effect if and when a signatory 
state decides not to become a party to the treaty. See id. 
 202 See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 94 (2000) (citation 
omitted). Aust writes: 
It is sometimes argued that a state which has not yet ratified a treaty must, 
in accordance with Article 18, nevertheless comply with it, or, at least, 
do nothing inconsistent with its provisions. The argument is clearly 
wrong, since the act of ratification would then have no purpose because 
the obligation to perform the treaty would not then be dependent on 
ratification. 
Id. 
 203 Two examples illustrate this point: (1) Some commentators argued that, by virtue of 
its earlier signature, the United States had an obligation to avoid testing nuclear weapons 
under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, even though the U.S. Senate had 
previously rejected the Treaty. See Bradley, supra note 44, at 315-16. (2) In 2013, President 
Obama signed the ATT despite substantial opposition to it in the Senate. The ATT provides 
that “[a]ny State may at the time of signature . . . declare that it will apply provisionally 
Article 6 and Article 7 pending the entry into force of this Treaty for that State.” ATT, 
supra note 121, at art. 23. Some senators feared that the Obama Administration would avail 
itself of this provision to implement the ATT before the Senate could render its own 
(presumably negative) judgment via its advice-and-consent role. See Bradley & Goldsmith, 
supra note 45, at 1239-40 n.171. 
 204 See supra note 12. 
 205 See Puras Letter, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
 206 See Senate Report, supra note 12, at 30 (expressing the understanding that the CERD 
prohibited only those fiscal and social policies that could be shown to be motivated by 
discriminatory animus). 
 207 Bridgeman, supra note 179. 
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greater state participation is secured by respecting the exercise of sovereign 
state choice or by marginalizing it. The VCLT’s forgiving and flexible regime 
regarding the acceptability of treaty reservations is an example of the former 
manner of securing broad state participation;208 the strategic choice of modal 
verb forms in the Paris Agreement, of the latter. Wrote one reporter: “The 
U.S. had insisted throughout the negotiating process that the [Paris] deal not 
include any legally binding language that would have required the White 
House to submit it to the Senate for approval.”209 Indeed, when Koh described 
the Paris Agreement as the culmination of a “daring change in [the] diplomatic 
approach to international treaty commitments” which was made in response 
to the U.S. Senate’s previous rejection of the Kyoto Protocol,210 he was subtly 
confirming that Paris’s architects sought to avoid the possibility of Senate 
rejection by avoiding, rather than by satisfying, the Senate.211 
If we wish for further proof on this point we shall find it in the asymmetry 
that characterizes the entry and exit attributes of these ostensibly political 
commitments. Logic dictates that such commitments be easy to revoke or 
ignore by the sole entity (the executive) that made them. From a 
sovereigntist’s perspective, such exit flexibility would go some way toward 
compensating for the exclusion of the national legislature on the question of 
entry. However, if the Paris Agreement is any indication, executive-driven 
exit may be anything but quick or easy. The withdrawal provisions of that 
Agreement were carefully crafted to ensure that anti-Paris factions in the 
United States would have to win two Presidential elections, not just one, in 
order to take the United States out. As Koh has explained (with evident 
satisfaction): 
The Paris Agreement only recognizes withdrawal under the 
terms specified in the Agreement’s text, which plainly declares 
that a party cannot give note of withdrawal to the U.N. 
Secretary General until “three years from the date on which 
this Agreement has entered into force.” Since the Paris 
 
 208 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE 
L.J. 485, 500-06 (2002). 
 209 Joshua Keating, The One Word That Almost Scuttled the Climate Deal, SLATE (Dec. 
14, 2015), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/12/climate-deal-came-down-to-the-di 
fference-between-shall-and-should.html. 
 210 See Koh, supra note 19, at 351. 
 211 Koh’s assurance that the Paris Agreement enjoyed a measure of Congressional 
approval because it was concluded against the backdrop of prior Congressional 
authorizations to the executive branch to tackle the problems of pollution and climate 
change is undermined by his acknowledgement that the Paris Agreement was one of the 
two “most important and controversial diplomatic arrangements of the Obama 
Administration.” Id. at 349 (emphasis added). See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 
45, at 1252 (noting that the Paris Agreement was concluded “in the face of congressional 
opposition”) and id. at n.235. 
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Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016, the 
earliest date that the U.S. could even give such legal notice 
would be November 4, 2019. That notification would then take 
another year to take legal effect, meaning that Trump cannot 
legally withdraw the U.S. from the Agreement until November 
4, 2020, the day after the next U.S. presidential election. Until 
then, Trump’s withdrawal announcement has no more legal 
meaning than one of his tweets.212 
The image of American negotiators working with foreign governments to 
create ways to insulate an agreement from the disapproving judgment of the 
American electorate is, I submit, a deeply disturbing one. Yet surprisingly, 
some commentators claim to see in such calendar chicanery a validation of 
democracy rather than its rather obvious insult. Bridgeman, for example, has 
written:  
This four-year minimum timeline is crucial in light of the 
intense domestic debate on the merits of staying in the 
Agreement: it sets up the November 2020 U.S. election as a 
referendum of sorts on whether the United States should 
indeed follow through with Trump’s announced 
withdrawal.213 
Bridgeman overlooks the fact that, for reasons explained above,214 the 
2016 presidential election already served as a “referendum of sorts” on the 
wisdom of the Paris Agreement—a referendum seemingly lost by Paris 
proponents. Suffice it to say that democracy has not traditionally been 
understood to allow for successive rounds of voting until the desired outcome 
is achieved. To make matters worse, pro-Paris factions and scholars have 
come up with a range of claims and tactics designed to make the Agreement 
as sticky as possible as a matter of U.S. domestic law. These efforts are 
surveyed in Part II. 
Requiring state compliance with treaty provisions in the period prior to 
legislative ratification rests on an ambitious misreading of Article 18 of the 
VCLT. As Bradley has explained, based on an analysis of Article 18’s drafting 
history and text, Article 18 does not require states, upon signing, to comply 
with a treaty’s provisions, only to preserve those elements of the exo-
agreement status quo that make future compliance upon ratification possible 
and meaningful.215 In other words, Article 18 seems to have been intended as 
 
 212 Koh, supra note 178, at 436. 
 213 Bridgeman, supra note 179. 
 214 See supra notes 193-197 and accompanying text. 
 215 See Bradley, supra note 44, at 327-30. 
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a garden-variety anti-fraud device meant to deter states from taking bad faith 
measures that deny counter-parties the benefit(s) of their bargain.216 This 
narrow construction of Article 18 is not only correct as a technical matter; it 
is essential for the preservation of the voice of national legislatures and 
citizenries regarding the type and scope of international commitments their 
states assume.217 The danger to democracies of a broad construction of Article 
18 is not lessened by the vague assurance, offered by some, that the interim 
compliance obligation attaches only to core treaty provisions, not peripheral 
ones.218 How “coreness” is to be assessed remains distressingly unclear. And 
the danger to democracy is positively heightened when the broad construction 
is paired with the strange notion, advanced by others, that an unratified treaty 
cannot legally be unsigned.219 Indeed, this combination of ideas represents a 
one-two doctrinal punch to the sovereignty gut: The broad construction of 
Article 18 would get states easily “in” to the substantive obligations imposed 
by treaties, while the alleged prohibition on unsigning would keep them from 
ever getting out. States would be facing a veritable perpetual purgatory of 
compliance. 
The globalists’ use of VCLT Article 25 presents a somewhat different 
concern. It cannot be said to rest on a misreading of that Article, as 
commentators appear to agree that provisional application can in fact “bind a 
nation to all or part of a treaty, not just to an obligation not to defeat its object 
and purpose.”220 However, depending on the content of the treaty and the 
political context, its use can certainly reflect an insensitive level of 
indifference on the part of treaty negotiators to the constitutional tensions 
foreseeably created at the domestic level of those signatory states that entrust 
the ratification-decision to the legislature. Such indifference goes beyond the 
 
 216 As such, Article 18 would appear to be inapplicable to human-rights instruments, such 
as the ICSECR, which do not typically memorialize the kinds of quid pro quo that are 
vulnerable to interim-period machination. Cf. id. at 332. 
 217 See David H. Moore, The President’s Unconstitutional Treatymaking, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 598, 631-32 (2012) (concluding that “[o]n textual, structural, and historical grounds, 
the President’s assumption of interim obligations runs afoul of the Constitution”). 
 218 See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights 
Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 173 (2003). 
 219 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 178, at 435-36 (citing the Bush II Administration’s 
experience with the Rome Statute for the proposition that “[i]nternational law makes clear 
that U.S. presidents cannot simply delete prior signatures from treaties”). This argument 
has little merit. In signing a treaty, a democratic nation expresses, via its executive, an 
intent to deliberate and reach a decision regarding ratification via formal proceedings 
usually involving the legislature in some capacity. The act of unsigning is simply the 
expression of a counter-intent (i.e. no deliberation will occur because there is no possibility 
that binding consent to the treaty will be granted). Such reversal is expressly contemplated 
by Article 18 itself when it refers to a point at which a state makes “its intention clear not 
to become a party to the treaty.” At this point, Article 18 tells us, the interim obligation 
ceases because the interim period itself has collapsed. 
 220 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1238. 
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posture of mere neutrality that international law customarily adopts regarding 
the manner in which states meet their international commitments. And 
indifference is not necessarily the worst of it. The use of Article 25 can also 
represent a rather cynical ploy to give key pro-globalist executive branch 
officials the legal hook they need to implement agreements having 
controversial domestic ramifications against the wishes of their legislatures. 
The ATT, prior to its 2019 unsigning by President Trump, arguably 
exemplified this ploy. As noted above, the ATT contains a provisional 
application provision that aroused the suspicions of some U.S. Senators as to 
the unilateral intentions of the Obama Administration.221 Opposition to the 
ATT in Congress was widespread and rooted in concern over the ATT’s 
impact on Second Amendment gun rights222—a concern that neither the 
ATT’s drafters nor the pro-gun-control Obama Administration seemed to 
share.223 While it is true that provisional application is sometimes limited “to 
obligations not inconsistent with each country’s domestic law,”224 this 
limitation does little to preserve a legislature’s ratification voice in cases 
where the obligation either is new in nature (and thus not reflected in extant 
domestic law) or burdens, but does not outright violate, domestic rights or 
privileges (the Second Amendment scenario). The only failsafe way to limit 
mischief in these two cases is to amend Article 25 to clarify that provisional 
application is available as a matter of international law only if it is consistent 
with a signatory state’s domestic constitutional processes, not substantive law. 
We come, finally, to Alston’s and Puras’s decisions to publicly interpret 
the CERD in ways that ran counter to the clear understanding of the ratifying 
Senate. While that Senate might be chided for not including its understandings 
in its package of RUDs to the CERD, certainly jurisdictional comity does not 
normally depend on the fulfilment of such formalities. This is especially true 
given, in Alston’s case, the U.S. Senate’s determined refusal to ratify the 
ICESCR and, in Puras’s case, the highly controversial nature of the reading 
he was advancing. Even the most ardent promoters of the CERD, such as 
 
 221 See supra note 203. 
 222 See Larry Bell, The U.N. Arms Trade Treaty: Are Our 2nd Amendment Rights Part 
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 223 See ATT, supra note 121, preamble (acknowledging the legitimacy of ownership and 
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17 Times Obama Has Pushed for Stronger Gun Control, POLITICO (Aug. 26, 2015), https:// 
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Meron, put forward the disparate impact argument only tentatively, in 
recognition of the enormity of its implications.225 
But I would make a larger point here, which is that, more than anything 
else, Alston’s and Puras’s moves reflect a tendency on the part of globalists 
to try to capture the castle cheaply via definitional and interpretive fiat. I have 
previously noted the manipulation of categories and labels done for the 
purpose of immunizing certain favored customary norms against persistent 
objection.226 We have seen French President Macron suggest a novel use of 
the word democracy in a bid to immortalize treaty commitments.227 And 
Puras’s redefinition of “discrimination” to include non-invidious disparate 
impact seems nothing if not small potatoes compared to the globalists’ 
wholesale redefinition of “sovereignty” twenty years ago228 in a bid to 
legitimize a new international duty of humanitarian intervention—the 
“Responsibility to Protect”—that was destined to thoroughly wreck one state 
(Libya)229 and threaten the health and well-being of another (Syria).230 The 
bottom line is that globalists appreciate the power and malleability of words 
and have not hesitated to harness both to advance the Sources Project at the 
international level. 
III.  PART II: QUOD EST INFERIUS EST SICUT QUOD EST SUPERIUS: THE 
SOURCES PROJECT AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL 
If the aim of the Sources Project at the international level has been the 
creation of universally binding international obligations despite the opposition 
of dissenting states, its aim at the domestic level has been to secure states’ 
compliance with such obligations despite the opposition of national political 
branches concerned to preserve the prerogatives of sovereignty. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the same two tactics that have been deployed at the 
international level are evident at the domestic level: (1) Using CIL as a tool 
 
 225 See Theodor Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the 
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Intervention and State Sovereignty (Dec. 2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS% 
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J. INT’L L. 515 (2018). 
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of internalization when the use of treaties is blocked or blunted; and (2) 
enhancing treaties themselves as a tool of internalization by changing the 
secondary rules that regulate how they acquire domestic legal effect. Quod est 
inferius est sicut quod est superius.231 I shall discuss each tactic in turn, using 
the United States as the case study. 
 
A. CIL to the Rescue of Unratified and Unimplemented Treaties 
 
As the presidency of Jimmy Carter—a “governmental norm sponsor[]” 
according to Koh232—was nearing its end in the late 1970s, it was becoming 
clear that the U.S. Senate either would not ratify the large and growing body 
of international human rights treaties or would ratify them subject to RUDs 
that rendered them unenforceable as domestic law. Globalist legal scholars 
were predictably appalled and began casting about for a way to get such 
treaties “in” despite this limitation. Hence the genesis in or around 1980 of 
what Bradley and Goldsmith later chose to call the Modern Position: the claim 
that the treaty-mimicking corpus of CIL, or parts thereof, qualified as post-
Erie233 federal common law which was (1) binding on the fifty states by virtue 
of the Supremacy Clause; (2) binding on the President by virtue of the Take 
Care Clause; (3) potentially binding on the U.S Congress, as respects any prior 
inconsistent federal legislation, by virtue of the “last in time” rule; and (4) 
potentially binding on the U.S. Congress, as respects any subsequent 
inconsistent federal legislation, by virtue of the allegedly constitutional status 
of CIL norms.234 Critics of the Modern Position charged—and some 
proponents freely conceded—that it was devised to enable “federal courts to 
accomplish through the back door of CIL what the political branches have 
prohibited through the front door of treaties.”235 In other words, what we had 
in the Modern Position was an attempt to reprise at the domestic level Prosper 
Weil’s nightmare—a campaign to cleverly outflank that which could not be 
frontally assaulted. 
The Modern Position was problematic for a number of reasons well 
documented in the literature. It represented a clear affront to the democratic 
processes of the federal government. It reflected a crude cherry-picking of the 
attributes of the “new” federal common law that Erie had paved the way for, 
eagerly claiming for CIL the status of supreme federal law while disregarding 
Erie’s requirement that any such law be authorized in some fashion by the 
 
 231 “That which is below is like that which is above.” 
 232 Koh, supra note 105, at 1410. 
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U.S. Constitution or federal legislation.236 It was illogical: Why should CIL 
norms be self-executing in the U.S. judicial system when treaty norms, which 
enjoy far greater democratic legitimacy owing to the Senate’s advice and 
consent role, are not?237 It was, finally, frightening in its implications. When 
one combined the liberal rules of modern CIL-formation238 with the most 
ambitious versions of the Modern Position,239 the possibility opened up that, 
as a matter of domestic rules of recognition, politically-unaccountable NSAs 
could play a role in nullifying the statutory work-product of the U.S. 
Congress.240 
Fortunately, a great deal of wind was taken out of the sails of the Modern 
Position by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.241 
Whatever else Sosa may stand for—and there is disagreement242—it made 
reasonably clear that CIL norms that do not enjoy the support of the U.S. 
Congress are unlikely to be deemed self-executing in legal actions before the 
federal courts. In what may have been the most consequential moment of its 
opinion, the Sosa Court indicated a reluctance to entertain, as possible sources 
of self-executing CIL, international instruments that Congress either considers 
to be aspirational in nature (viz. the UDHR) or has left unimplemented (viz. 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).243 Anyone who 
understands the overarching rationale of the Modern Position will understand 
the significance of the Court’s reluctance on this point. 
Following Sosa there appear to be only two ways in which globalists can 
make use of CIL to engineer U.S. compliance with treaty norms that have 
been rejected or left unimplemented by the Senate (or by Congress as a 
whole). One way is to convince a sympathetic President to recognize and 
accept such norms as CIL. Presidents have done this with respect to several 
 
 236 See id. at 324 (“To be consistent with the requirements of Erie . . . [the] new federal 
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International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 871-73 
(2007). 
 243 Sosa, 512 U.S. at 734-35. 
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conventions,244 and time will tell whether greater use of this tactic is made and 
condoned in the future. It is an interesting and open question whether such 
presidential recognition would constitute political branch endorsement 
sufficient to satisfy Erie’s test for federal common law and thereby permit a 
CIL norm’s enforcement via private lawsuits brought in federal court. I 
suspect it would not, as presidential directive is plainly neither Constitution 
nor federal statute.245 A second way to still use CIL is to persuade the Supreme 
Court to take CIL norms into account when interpreting provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution. This tactic has also been used with some success,246 no doubt 
due to the presence on the Court of what Koh has called a “transnationalist 
faction” of justices who are prepared to serve as a “critical link between the 
international and the domestic legal spheres” and who “use their interpretive 
powers to promote the development of a global legal system.”247 But getting 
customary norms “in” via the Constitution ultimately depends on the 
availability of colorably serviceable constitutional text—a stubborn fact likely 
to limit the utility of this tactic to the globalist agenda going forward. 
 
B. International Agreements Without Congress: A Primer 
 
In addition to attempting to use CIL as a collateral device for getting treaty 
norms “in,” globalist scholars have tried to rework the secondary 
internalization rules relating directly to treaties themselves. Henkin, for 
example, was for many years at the forefront of a movement to win the 
judiciary over to the view that non-self-executing treaty declarations offend 
the spirit of the Constitution and might be unconstitutional. He stated his case 
in a 1995 article for the American Journal of International Law: 
Article VI of the Constitution provides expressly for 
lawmaking by treaty: treaties are declared to be the supreme 
law of the land. The Framers intended that a treaty should 
become law ipso facto, when the treaty is made; it should not 
require legislative implementation to convert it into United 
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States law. In effect, lawmaking by treaty was to be an 
alternative to legislation by Congress.248 
Henkin believed that if ever there was proof of American hypocrisy 
respecting international law (i.e. international law is for them, not us), the non-
self-executing declarations favored by the Senate were it.249 And one can 
certainly understand his frustration; rights without legal remedies are usually 
not worth very much. On the other hand, Henkin was insensitive to the 
implications of his argument. While it is true that the Framers did not 
“contemplate[] that some treaties might not be law of the land,”250 neither 
could they have contemplated the possibility of a world in which international 
law would seek to intrude so deeply into the political culture and jurisdiction 
of nation-states via the modern human rights movement. The self-execution 
of treaties in the era of classical international law posed little threat to the 
power and prerogatives of the U.S. House of Representatives (which is shut 
out of the constitutionally prescribed treaty ratification process) because that 
law confined itself largely to interstate matters. However, in our current era 
of intrastate-focused international law, self-execution poses a substantial 
threat, for obvious reasons. Henkin’s argument also ran afoul of basic 
doctrinal logic. If as a matter of domestic law the Senate can reject a treaty 
altogether, then surely it ought to be able to approve it subject to limiting 
conditions like non-self-execution. Surely the greater power includes the 
lesser. If it did not, the federal courts would not proceed with the caution they 
do in inferring private causes of action from domestic statutes prescribing 
domestic rules of conduct. The Sosa Court affirmed as much, albeit in the 
context of considering the self-execution of CIL instead of treaties.251 The 
bottom line is that Henkin’s complaint, however understandable as a political 
statement, missed the mark widely as a legal one.252 
Any doubt on this score was removed by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Medellin v. Texas,253 which was to Henkin’s argument what Sosa had been to 
the Modern Position: a large bucket of cold water, liberally poured. The 
Medellin Court not only did not think that the Constitution requires most 
treaties to be deemed self-executing;254 it also appeared to endorse a 
presumption against self-execution which can be overcome only if there is 
clear evidence in treaty text or structure that the treaty was intended to be self-
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executing by the Senate that ratified it.255 In opting for this originalist 
approach—which was the opposite of Henkin’s vision—the Court rejected as 
“novel” 256 and “arrestingly indeterminate” 257 the more internationally 
minded test for self-execution proposed by Justice Breyer, which would have 
substituted judicial assessment of the benefits of self-execution in any given 
case for the ratifying Senate’s own historical judgment.258 The Court also 
rejected, as constitutionally irrelevant and ineffective, the “unprecedented 
action”259 of the George W. Bush Administration in seeking to implement 
unilaterally, via executive order, the non-self-executing treaty commitment at 
issue in the case (which Congress had chosen to leave unimplemented).260 
This ruling not only preserved Congress’s exclusive gate-keeping role 
apropos non-self-executing treaties; it also implicitly cast doubt on the claim, 
discussed above,261 that the President can constitutionally cause the United 
States to comply with the provisions of unratified treaties under color of 
Articles 18 or 25 of the VCLT. 
One might think that, following Medellin, globalist legal scholars would 
have felt some hesitation in arguing for expanded presidential power (vis-à-
vis Congress) over the nation’s international lawmaking. Yet nothing could 
be further from the truth. During the eight years that followed Medellin—
years that coincided with the two-term Obama Presidency—globalists bid 
several novel theories designed to justify the President in entering the United 
States into international agreements without much, if any, congressional 
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involvement. There was, to begin with, the “new” theory that came to be 
known in the literature as “Executive Agreements+”.262 Executive 
Agreements+ holds that the President can conclude a legally binding 
international agreement on virtually any subject, regardless of whether it is 
committed mostly to the care of Congress under Article I of the Constitution, 
provided the agreement advances or is consistent with policy goals adopted 
by Congress in purely domestic legislation.263 The Obama Administration 
deployed Executive Agreements+ in justifying its unilateral ratification—
under cover of the darkness created by the 2013 government shutdown—of 
the Minamata Convention on Mercury, a comprehensive international 
agreement concerning the production, use, and disposal of the chemical.264 
Non-globalist scholars were left shaking their heads at the brazenness of this 
presidential power grab, with Bradley and Goldsmith opining that it was 
“difficult to overstate the breadth of this purported authority . . . .”265  
When ex ante congressional authorization was felt to be needed by the 
Obama Administration, it was reverse-engineered in a disingenuous fashion 
that might be called “Fake Authorization.” Administration lawyers, signed 
treaty text already in hand, would scour the U.S. Code looking for any statute 
that might plausibly be read to allow for the conclusion of the international 
agreement in question.266 Led by Koh as then-State Department Legal 
Adviser, the Obama Administration attempted Fake Authorization with 
respect to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)267—again 
provoking expressions of surprise and consternation on the part of members 
of the legal academy, some of whom reached out to Congress and warned it 
not to let itself be used in this manner.268 The scholars wrote:  
The present issue reaches far beyond the topical matters 
covered by ACTA, into the fundamental Constitutional issue 
of separation of powers. If Congress allows the Executive to 
claim that ACTA was authorized by language that clearly does 
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not authorize the agreement, it will be ceding unprecedented 
power to the Executive.269  
In truth, it does not take much thought to discern that if members of Congress 
would be surprised to learn from State Department lawyers that Congress had 
authorized the conclusion of an international agreement, then Congress did 
not do so. 
Then there was the Obama Administration’s “significant constitutional 
innovation”270 of marrying a President’s international political-commitment 
authority with pre-existing statutory delegations that give those commitments 
the possibility of legal teeth under domestic law.271 The Paris Agreement 
epitomized this combination. President Obama’s internationally nonbinding 
political pledge regarding the United States’ emissions reductions was 
implemented via existing regulatory authorities that had been delegated by 
Congress years before for different, albeit related purposes.272 Bradley and 
Goldsmith label this move a “consequential political commitment,”273 but I 
prefer to call it “Henkin’s Revenge,” for it represents a sly form of payback 
by the globalists for the Senate’s long-time habit of turning the nation’s 
international legal obligations into domestic political commitments via the use 
of the non-self-execution declaration. And while Bradley and Goldsmith 
perceive no real danger in Henkin’s Revenge as a constitutional matter,274 I 
am not nearly as sanguine. 
The Paris Agreement is best categorized as an executive agreement made 
pursuant to treaty, the treaty being the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate, to which the Senate gave its advice and consent in 1992.275 The 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee “expressed the expectation that future 
agreements that would require legally binding emissions reductions . . . would 
require the Senate’s advice and consent.”276 But there are two levels on which 
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an international agreement can be legally binding—the international and the 
domestic—and I see no reason to confine the Senate’s expectations regarding 
future agreements under the UNFCCC to the former level. After all, the 
legally binding nature of agreements on the international plane can mean quite 
little due to the international system’s overall lack of effective enforcement 
mechanisms. What really matters is the legal nature of any domestic impact 
of such agreements. In this key sense the Paris Agreement, including President 
Obama’s emissions pledge, has borne deep legal consequences for the United 
States. The administrative regulations enacted by the Obama Administration 
to implement the pledge—such as the Clean Power Plan277—legally bind 
firms and persons in the United States. They also legally bind Congress in the 
sense that Congress will have to take affirmative legislative steps in order to 
get rid of them. It will have to either rescind the underlying statutory 
delegations or amend them to clarify that they may not be used as a basis to 
implement unilateral presidential political pledges. Either action will be 
burdened by the usual inertia and collective-action barriers, as well as by 
potential presidential veto.278 Finally, pro-Paris groups, led in the academy by 
Koh, have vowed to do their utmost to ensure that the Obama-era regulations 
legally bind any future President who might seek to disturb them. It is beyond 
ironic that in the very same 2017 article in which he emphasized the purely 
political nature of the emissions pledge,279 and cited it as justification for 
President Obama’s unilateral ratification of the Paris Agreement,280 Koh 
warned the Trump Administration of the likelihood of litigation on multiple 
fronts should it attempt to rescind or slow walk the Paris regulatory effort.281 
Koh has also claimed that President Trump lacks the constitutional authority 
to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement without Congress’s 
approval.282 This is an astonishing suggestion, also backed by a litigation 
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threat, that rests on the unsound logic that a President may not unilaterally 
undo what his predecessor unilaterally did.283 
In sum, the Paris Agreement represents a situation in which one President 
has unilaterally pledged the nation to serious international undertakings in 
areas outside core Article II responsibilities and—owing to the pledge’s 
domestic legal teeth—neither Congress nor a future President can easily free 
the nation from that commitment. Is this merely “aggressive innovation” 
(Koh’s term284) and/or “pragmatism” (Justice Beyer’s term285)? Or are we 
looking instead at the unconstitutional assertion of a quasi-monarchical 
prerogative? I would argue the latter and urge that we not let semantics get in 
the way of clear thinking on this point. To say that an international 
commitment on the part of a President is legally binding is not to say that it is 
irreversible; it is only to say that it is reversible solely through legal means. 
Depending on the political context, those means may be difficult to muster. It 
is highly unlikely that the Senate that ratified the UNFCCC thought it was 
writing a blank check for the amount of effort it, future Congresses, and future 
Presidents would need to expend in order to have their contemporary political 
judgments honored within our system of government. Henkin’s Revenge 
therefore poses a considerable constitutional problem. 
And sadly, the Paris Agreement may be but the tip of the iceberg in this 
regard. However problematic and controversial its emissions cap pledge was 
and remains, that pledge has at least been well known to both Congress and 
the public from its inception. Many presidential political commitments of a 
regulatory nature are apparently not so published and accordingly fly under 
the criticism-and-accountability radar. Bradley and Goldsmith write: 
Executive branch officials in the last few decades have 
increasingly used political commitments to effectuate broader 
and deeper regulatory cooperation between U.S. government 
agencies and their foreign counterparts on a wide range of 
regulatory topics. . . . There are scores of . . . examples. Taken 
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withdrawal] decision . . . no one questioned the President’s legal authority to terminate”). 
The only supportive precedent Koh cites is the inapposite Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 
996 (1979), which concerned President Carter’s attempt to unilaterally terminate a treaty 
that had been ratified by the Senate. See Koh, supra note 19, at 358. 
 284 See Koh, supra note 178, at 442. 
 285 See STEPHEN G. BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2011). 
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together, political commitments have an enormous impact on 
the everyday activities of U.S. firms and persons. But not only 
are they not subject to any of the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), they are not even 
published systematically or reported to Congress.286 
It may surprise few to learn that the Obama Administration actively 
encouraged this practice of semi-secret international rulemaking,287 which 
perhaps might best be called “Secret Henkin’s Revenge.” 
All told, the Obama Administration’s legal innovations went some way 
toward blunting the sovereignty-protective effect of the Sosa and Medellin 
rulings. The Administration was willing to (1) assume Congress’s assent to its 
international agreements (Executive Agreements+); (2) fake Congress’s 
assent (Fake Authorization); (3) saddle Congress with regulations 
implementing agreements Congress was told it did not need to assent to 
(Henkin’s Revenge); and (4) saddle the country with regulations Congress and 
the public know next-to-nothing about (Secret Henkin’s Revenge). Koh 
would have us believe that we face a stark choice: either allow the President 
to keep his new toys or face the prospect that he will use the hard power of 
the U.S. military to achieve the nation’s goals.288 Yet surely this is a false 
choice (and one, I might add, that borders inappropriately on emotional 
blackmail). Sovereigntists are not opposed to the conclusion of international 
agreements. Nor, needless to say, are we in favor of militarism, war or 
mayhem. We simply oppose the exclusion of Congress from the process of 
international agreement-making. Bradley and Goldsmith appear to hope that 
greater transparency regarding the President’s unilateral activities will place 
Congress in a position where it can at least fight for its own inclusion.289 
Perhaps–time will tell. One thing, however, is certain: From a sovereigntist’s 
perspective, the Brave New Legal World bequeathed to us by the Obama 
Administration makes Henkin’s impassioned insistence on the self-execution 
of most treaties look downright quaint and conservative. 
 
 286 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1218-19 (emphasis added). 
 287 See id. at 1219 n.62. 
 288 Koh writes: 
Even in a Trump presidency, it is a mistake to conclude that the goal of 
constitutional interpretation should be to raise the costs of presidential 
action in foreign affairs, without regard to issue area. After all, if our 
constitutional readings make it harder for the President to make 
international deals than to go to war, that legal rigidity will inevitably 
shift presidential incentives to rely upon—and overextend—lethal tools 
of American hard power instead of deploying our diplomatic, smart 
power resources. 
Koh, supra note 19, at 364-65. 
 289 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1287-94. 
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C. Desperate Times Calling for Desperate Measures? Footnote Ninety-Two 
and the Descent of Harold Koh 
 
I cannot end this tour of the domestic level of the Sources Project without 
calling attention to some startling suggestions and calls-to-action made by one 
of the Project’s most enthusiastic and influential participants, Harold Koh. As 
noted above, the 2016 election of Donald Trump to the Presidency evoked a 
measure of consternation in globalist scholarly circles.290 Unlike other 
scholars and commentators, however, Koh did not confine his criticism of 
President Trump’s nationalistic program to arguments of a purely legal nature. 
Instead, he sought to depreciate the importance of the entire class of domestic 
actor that President Trump represented, viz. democratically-elected 
officialdom. In his early 2017 article published in The Yale Law Journal 
Forum, Koh wrote the following: 
Most fundamentally, these case studies [the Paris Agreement 
and the Iran Nuclear Agreement] remind us that today, 
America’s observance of law—both international and 
constitutional—is preserved not just by the federal political 
branches and those officials who lead them at any particular 
time, but by an ongoing transnational legal process whose 
diverse stakeholders are not controlled by elected officials.291 
Koh then proceeded to identify these stakeholders in a footnote that I refer 
to below as “Footnote Ninety-Two”: 
These [stakeholders] include: (1) the courts; (2) states and 
localities; (3) nongovernmental organizations; (4) formal and 
informal media; (5) allies and international organizations; and 
(6) a robust federal bureaucracy that has seen many political 
leaders come and go. . . . These bureaucrats have myriad ways 
of saying “Yes, Minister,” i.e., signaling political obedience, 
even while doing their best to continue along the previous 
bureaucratic path.292 
 
 290 See supra notes 176-197 and accompanying text. 
 291 Koh, supra note 19, at 366; see also id. at 361 (“The key point, as one commentator 
put it, is that ‘there is no reason to believe that people will want good health, better 
technologies, or clean air less just because of a change in administration . . . .’”) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
 292 Id. at 366 n.92. 
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Where to begin? There is certainly nothing wrong with Koh’s first 
nominated stakeholder—the judiciary—unless one has in mind litigation of 
dubious merit that is designed to harass, delay, or obstruct the elected 
government. Koh has indicated that he does embrace this type of litigation 
vis-à-vis the Trump Administration.293 Likewise, while there is nothing per se 
untoward about seeking to enlist states and localities in a campaign to “hold 
America’s [national] leaders accountable for their [international] 
commitments,” 294 Koh is arguably the last scholar one would expect to do so. 
His international law mentor, Henkin, evinced a rather profound hostility 
toward federalism and states’ rights;295 and Koh himself, in his pre-Sosa days 
of advocating for the Modern Position, vehemently opposed the intrusion of 
state law into areas of international concern.296 
The four remaining nominated stakeholders are considerably more 
problematic than the first two. Kenneth Anderson and David Rieff have 
persuasively explained why NGOs and “civil society”—the globalists’ stock 
cure for the democracy deficit at the heart of the international order—are 
unlikely to represent any interests but their own (and, I might add, those of 
their donors).297 That Koh hopes to enlist the media against the Trump 
Administration raises obvious concerns about journalistic integrity and ethics. 
That he hopes to enlist foreign countries and international organizations 
suggests a lack of concern to protect U.S. political debate and processes from 
foreign influence and interference, however ostensibly benign. Finally, his 
call to career bureaucrats to stymie the Trump Administration through quiet 
 
 293 For example, even though Koh, for good reason, does not appear to think highly of 
the chances of success of litigation based on Goldwater v. Carter (see supra note 283), he 
advocates for it anyway: “Yet even if a litigation challenge ultimately proved unsuccessful, 
the litigation could still last more than a year, thereby pushing the national decision of 
whether to complete withdrawal [from the Paris agreement] past Trump’s presidency.” 
Koh, supra note 178, at 440. 
 294 Koh, supra note 19, at 366. 
 295 See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 248, at 344-46. 
 296 See Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law? 111 HARV. L. REV. 
1824 (1998). An impression of forum-shopping is equally evident in Koh’s eagerness to 
bring Congress into the Paris-Agreement picture now that a nationalist occupies the Oval 
Office. See supra notes 282-283 and accompanying text. 
 297 See Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, “Global Civil Society”: A Sceptical View, AM. 
U. WASH. COLL. OF L. (Wash. Coll. of L. Research Paper No. 2008-69, 2005), https://ssrn.c 
om/abstract=899771; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 50, at 34 (describing international 
NGOs as “unaccountable, self-appointed, unrepresentative organizations” that do not 
speak “for world public opinion”). 
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acts of disobedience298—including, it would seem, intelligence leaks299—may 
represent a first in nearly one hundred years of scholarship on the American 
administrative state. Historically, the U.S. bureaucracy has been either 
criticized for being an undemocratic element in our political system (the 
majority view) or praised for being a democratic element (the minority 
view).300 Never to my knowledge has it been praised for being an 
undemocratic element. It would seem that, in Koh, the “Deep State” has found 
its first public apologist.301 
With the exception of the states and localities, Koh’s nominated 
stakeholders are either wholly politically unaccountable or deeply politically 
insulated. And yet it is Koh’s hope that, when combined, their counter-Trump 
efforts and advocacy will succeed in draining the Trump Administration of so 
much energy and political capital that it will be unable to deliver on President 
Trump’s 2016 campaign promises respecting the renegotiation or termination 
of certain international agreements.302 How Koh can think this is an 
appropriate political tactic in a democratic republic is a bit of a mystery, 
although he has left us some clues. He has made note of President Trump’s 
“weak coalition, minority electoral support, and limited political capital,”303 
indicating, perhaps, a view that the Trump Presidency lacks legitimacy 
because then-candidate Trump did not win the popular vote in the 2016 
presidential election. Yet surely Koh would recognize the unfairness of such 
a position (if in fact he subscribes to it). Presidential candidates campaign in 
the way best calculated to win them a majority of votes in the Electoral 
College, as that is how victory is determined. To impugn a Presidency because 
 
 298 See Koh, supra note 178, at 421 (“U.S. bureaucrats committed to international rules 
can continue to pursue a strategy of engage-translate-leverage to maintain default 
compliance with existing norms, unless explicitly directed to do otherwise”) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
 299 Koh writes approvingly of the fact that “the intelligence community and other parts 
of the bureaucracy apparently engaged in unprecedented leaking, providing more grist for 
the [anti-Muslim-travel-ban] lawsuits.” Id. at 426 (citation omitted). 
 300   See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 772 n.163 
(2001) (listing scholars who represent each view). 
 301 In a subsequent 2017 article that contains a near-carbon copy of Footnote Ninety-
Two, Koh appears to commend the bureaucrats for what he assumes to be their anti-Trump 
bias: “When a country elects a leader that nearly every employee of the State Department, 
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Departments of Justice and the Interior has 
voted against, those bureaucrats have myriad ways of saying ‘Yes, Minister.’” Koh, supra 
note 178, at 465 n.211. It is difficult to know which is worse: the bare fact of Koh’s 
assumption or the possibility of its truth. Either way, his hope that the bureaucrats will 
work to sabotage the work of a leader “a country elects” makes his past praise of 
democracy-promotion policies that are “dedicated to building democracy from the bottom 
up” ring horribly hollow. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Future of Lou Henkin’s Human 
Rights Movement, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 491 (2007). 
 302 See Koh, supra note 178, at 421. 
 303 Koh, supra note 19, at 361. 
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it does not rest on a victory in the popular vote is to judge it by a standard that 
the President qua candidate never sought to satisfy. 
Another possible explanation of Koh’s mindset, which I glean from his 
comments on the Trump Administration’s so-called “Muslim travel ban,”304 
is that he sees in President Trump Hitleresque tendencies toward the 
maltreatment or denigration of minorities. This, I would suggest, is a tough 
narrative to sell in light of three things: (1) the Supreme Court’s decisions 
upholding the travel ban and a second controversial Trump Administration 
immigration-policy directive;305 (2) the Trump Administration’s disinterest to 
date in using (as opposed to threatening to use) kinetic warfare as a tool to 
advance national interests; and (3) the reality of Trump Administration 
policies that are specifically designed to alleviate the plight of formerly-
oppressed minority groups.306 
A third possible explanation—one that is at once uncomfortable and 
necessary to ponder—is that Koh, like a number of other scholars and 
commentators in recent years, has lost his regard for the idea of popular 
control of government because he has lost faith in the capacity of his fellow 
citizens to make sound political, moral, and scientific judgments.307 If this 
third explanation is the correct one, then I would suggest that Koh’s Footnote 
Ninety-Two represents nothing so much as a twisted international variation 
on the theme of Justice Stone’s Footnote Four to the majority opinion in U.S. 
v. Carolene Products Co.308 As is well known, Footnote Four suggests that 
electoral democracy in the United States might legitimately be limited for the 
sake of preserving the individual rights and freedoms guaranteed expressly or 
impliedly by the U.S. Constitution.309 Koh’s apparent variation suggests that 
 
 304 Koh, supra note 178, at 422-30. 
 305 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (upholding travel ban); Nielsen v. Preap, 
139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (upholding vigorous enforcement of statute requiring deportation of 
legal immigrants with criminal records). 
 306 See, e.g., Josh Lederman, Trump Administration Launches Global Effort to End 
Criminalization of Homosexuality, NBC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security-trump-administration-launches-
global-effort-end-criminalization-on-homosexulaity-n97308; Tucker Higgins, President 
Trump Announces His Support for Criminal Justice Reform Legislation, Saying It’s ‘the 
Right Thing to Do’, CNBC (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/14/trump-
criminal-justice-reform-legislation-theri 
ght-thing-to-do.html. 
 307 For some revealing examples, see James Traub, It’s Time for the Elites to Rise Up 
Against the Ignorant Masses,” FOREIGN POL’Y (June 28, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/ 
2016/06/28/its-time-for-the-elites-to-rise-up-against-ignorant-masses-trump-2016-brexit/; 
Jason Brennan, Brexit, Democracy, and Epistocracy, PRINCETON U. PRESS BLOG (June 24, 
2016), https://blog.press.princeton.edu/2016/06/24/ethicist-jason-brennan-brexit-democra 
cy-and-epistocracy/. 
 308 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 309 See id. at 152 n.4. The Court indicated that it would apply a standard of review stricter 
than the rational-basis test to legislation that violated a specific provision of the 
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electoral democracy might legitimately be limited—and, if necessary, slyly 
subverted—for the sake of resolving certain matters of international concern 
on the basis of terms laid down by global “epistemic communities.”310 
Faithless bureaucratic agents enlisting in the service of a supranational, 
technocratic episteme poses the ultimate counter-majoritarian dilemma. If 
ever we were looking for confirmation that we are not in Kansas anymore, 
Koh’s Footnote Ninety-Two is probably it. 
IV.  PART III: HOW DO THEY JUSTIFY IT? 
The effort to understand how Koh justifies his advocacy of extreme 
methods to frustrate a newly-elected Presidency prompts similar, if larger, 
questions regarding the justifications offered by globalist legal scholars for 
the Sources Project as a whole. At the outset of this study we encountered 
Charney’s nominated justification, viz. certain urgent matters of global 
concern have put state consent as the source of international legal obligation 
out of humanity’s price range.311 It now seems appropriate, as a final matter, 
to turn a critical eye on this justification as well as on others put forward over 
the years. My aim is not so much to present a comprehensive critique as to 
offer a few trenchant remarks capable of prompting, perhaps, a 
reconsideration of long-held assumptions and positions. 
 
A. “We Can’t Afford the Consent Principle” 
 
Let us begin with Charney’s justification. It began life as a powerful 
narrative: Extreme times beget extreme measures. Aside from one or two 
slips-of-the-tongue,312 Charney presented the new coercive international 
power as a carefully delimited one that would be exercised in only a small 
number of extreme cases.313 Charney’s list was famously restricted to big-
ticket items like transnational environmental threats, international terrorism, 
war crimes, and grievous intra-state atrocities (e.g. apartheid or genocide).314 
We have seen, however, how the new, coercive CIL that developed in the 
wake of Charney’s proposal is capable of attaching to virtually any treaty or 
resolution irrespective of the gravity, urgency or transnational nature of the 
 
Constitution, compromised the functioning of democratic processes, or targeted with 
prejudicial action discrete and insular minorities. 
 310 See Koh, supra note 19, at 364-65 (noting that international law and institutions are 
currently developed “less through formal devices, and more through repeated dialogues 
within epistemic communities of international lawyers working for diverse governments 
and nongovernmental institutions.”). 
 311 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
 312 See supra note 86. 
 313 Charney, supra note 13, at 530. 
 314 Id. 
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activity addressed.315 No apparent thresholds need be met. Moreover, the 
recent attempts to re-cast treaties as permanent commitments that are off-
limits to domestic politics have not differentiated between treaties that address 
the most urgent global concerns and those that do not.316 If such attempts 
continue into the future, this omission may prove as negatively consequential 
for sovereignty as the CIL development just noted. The bottom line is that 
however sincere Charney may have been in assuring the world that the new 
international power would be used conservatively, his intent has not been 
honored by his academic colleagues or by the international lawyers who man 
important positions in Koh’s “epistemic communities.” Somewhere along the 
line, the expression “urgent global threat” lost the words “urgent” and 
“threat,” to become just “global.” This is a problem—if not for Charney, then 
certainly for sovereigntists. 
Regrettably, this is not the only way in which the “we can’t afford state 
consent” rationale has been deployed disingenuously. I noted in the 
introduction my belief, subscribed to by others, that international power 
structures are undemocratic because they lack the accountability mechanisms 
that ensure popular control of government.317 If this belief is correct, the 
argument that we can no longer afford state sovereignty and consent entails 
the argument that we can no longer afford democracy. Yet this grim 
consequence is seldom if ever admitted to by globalist legal scholars, either 
because they contest it and claim instead to have reconciled democracy with 
global governance,318 or more commonly because they ignore it and hope for 
the best.319 Their lack of candor matters because if the global public 
understood that globalization would cost them something as precious as 
democratic governance, they might assess more critically than they have 
heretofore those big-ticket items on Charney’s list, as well as the other 
rationales that have been advanced to justify globalization. Students of 
political philosophy well understand that authoritarian rule is often sold on the 
basis of an assumption of a deeply flawed and dangerous “state of nature.” 
But posit a congenial state of nature, or one marked by inconveniences that 
are fairly easily fixed or contained, and the need for an autocrat—technocratic 
and NGO-flavored or otherwise—disappears. We find ourselves tossing out 
our Hobbes and reaching for our Locke. The point is that people have little 
incentive to question the globalists’ depictions of the pre-globalized world—
the “state of nature,” if you will—if they are unaware that the solution being 
offered is of an authoritarian kind. Give them that awareness, and they are 
 
 315 See supra Part I.A.ii. 
 316 See supra Part I.B.i. 
 317 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
 318 See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 172. 
 319 From what he has written, it would appear that Stephan encountered this Panglossian 
attitude on the part of his colleagues during the late 1990s. See supra notes 20-21 and 
accompanying text. 
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then more likely to employ the scrutiny needed to make informed choices 
productive of efficient outcomes.320 
Examples in this regard are not hard to come by. Barbara Stark, among 
others, has urged congressional ratification of the ICESCR on the grounds that 
it “assures a safety net for those most vulnerable to the vagaries of global 
capitalism.”321 Her use of the word “vagaries” is interesting, as it suggests that 
economic crises and dislocations are as inevitable and unpreventable as 
natural disasters. And since natural disasters do not respect national 
boundaries, an international solution—in the form of a human rights 
instrument—would seem to be necessary. However, what if global 
capitalism’s vagaries are not the equivalent of a tornado or volcanic eruption 
but instead are the product of a specific school of scholarly thought, viz. neo-
liberal economics?322 And what if a different economic approach—a more 
protective or “Hamiltonian” one, say323—could put an end to those vagaries, 
or at least significantly blunt them?324 There would then be considerably less 
need for international socio-economic intervention in the form of the 
ICESCR, as well as for the kind of comprehensive global financial 
management provided by the Basel-based Bank of International 
Settlements.325 Similar logic can be applied to the issue of cross-border mass 
migration. This, too, is often portrayed as a quasi-natural phenomenon that 
can be treated by international means but not effectively prevented. Yet what 
if this portrayal is inaccurate? If, for example, the ongoing mass migration out 
of the Middle East and northern Africa is the result of a misguided Western 
policy of humanitarian bombing and regime-change, as I have argued 
elsewhere,326 the solution, it would seem, is straightforward: End that policy. 
Only then will we be in a position to know whether the Global Migration 
 
 320 By “efficient” I mean outcomes that achieve the greatest gain in collective 
management of genuine transborder problems for the least amount of loss of democratic 
sovereignty. 
 321 Stark, supra note 12, at 126. 
 322 Neo-liberal economics tends to prioritize unfettered market relations, endorse the 
dominance of capital over labor, and remain agnostic when it comes to assessing the merits 
of financialized, as opposed to productive, forms of capitalism. See DAVID M. KOTZ, THE 
RISE AND FALL OF NEOLIBERAL CAPITALISM (2017). 
 323 For background on the economic policies of Alexander Hamilton and his intellectual 
disciple Henry Clay, see Andrew Spannaus, The Roots of Trump’s ‘Economic 
Nationalism’, CONSORTIUM NEWS (Apr. 13, 2017), 
https://consortiumnews.com/2017/04/13/rootsof-trumps-economic-nationalism/. 
 324 This would appear to be the rationale behind President Trump’s tariff policy. See 
Tyler Durden, Trump Is Working to Change the Way Economists View Tariffs, 
ZEROHEDGE (May 10, 2019), https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-05-10/trump-
working-changeway-economists-view-tariffs. 
 325 For background on the seemingly hierarchical relationship between the Bank of 
International Settlements and U.S. Federal Reserve, see Benjamin, supra note 50, at 35-
41. 
 326 See Benjamin, supra notes 229-230. 
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Compact and the CIL likely to develop out of it 327 are truly necessary and 
worth the loss of democratic sovereignty they entail. 
The final problem with the “we can’t afford state consent” rationale is the 
technocratic hubris that sometimes accompanies it. It goes without saying that 
the call for coerced compliance with internationally crafted solutions would 
lack normative force unless it presumed solutions of high merit. State dissent 
and self-exclusion from flawed international approaches would hardly be 
cause for concern. Yet this logic can tempt the global “epistemic 
communities” to overstate the virtues of their agreed agendas. The Paris 
Agreement arguably serves as a case in point here. While President Trump 
believes Paris to represent merely a solution to the problem of climate 
change—and an extremely baleful one at that for the United States328—Paris 
proponents, eager to quash any suggestion of renegotiation, denounced the 
President’s withdrawal decision as though he had walked away from the 
solution.329 Their reaction was understandable given that their aim was 
universal adherence. Yet given the subject matter—not genocide or 
aggression, which admit of only one correct response,330 but a highly complex 
regulatory challenge that is not only amenable to different approaches of an 
honest kind but also vulnerable to corrupt capture—one would think they 
might have reconsidered that aim. Instead, they doubled down and insisted 
that their handiwork was immune to any reasonable criticism. 
 
B. “The Consent Principle Never Really Existed . . . Much.” 
 
If Charney had said, in effect, “we can’t afford state consent,” other 
globalist scholars, writing in his wake and perhaps not wanting to leave 
anything to chance, have advanced a second argument that boils down to this: 
‘The consent principle never really existed—at least not to the extent so often 
claimed—and we therefore should not be bothered by the fact that consent is 
increasingly dishonored as the key organizing principle of international 
 
 327 See supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text. 
 328 In explaining his withdrawal decision, the President expressed the view that an 
unacknowledged secondary agenda of wealth-transfer from West to East lay behind the 
Paris remediation scheme. See Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord 
(White House Office of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/br 
iefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/. 
 329 See, e.g., Kalina Oroschacoff, Jean-Claude Juncker: No Renegotiation of Paris 
Climate Deal, POLITICO (June 14, 2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/jean-claude-
juncker-no-renegotiation-of-paris-climate-deal/ (documenting Juncker’s dismissal, as “a 
distraction,” of the Trump Administration’s offer to renegotiate the terms of the Paris 
Agreement). 
 330 Along the lines of “Stop Now!” 
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law.’331 For such scholars, the voluntarist conception of international law—
under which international legal rules bind states only if they have expressly 
or impliedly agreed to them—is more or less a fiction, and an annoying fiction 
at that. Green, whom I have characterized as a mild globalist,332 writes for 
many when he states: 
[T]he voluntarist theory of international law is itself riddled 
with theoretical holes. . . . [T]he present author rejects the 
voluntarist understanding of international law, at least in its 
absolute form. It is observable social fact that binding 
international law is not always derived from state will. The 
“tortured legal process” of rooting the binding force of 
international law in the consent of states is both well known 
and commonly glossed over. . . . Ultimately, voluntarism is 
“plagued by contradictions” in relation to international law in 
general and customary international law in particular.333 
Green delivers this judgment with conviction, yet he also makes points and 
concessions that undermine it. He recognizes, for example, that the ICJ, since 
the 1927 decision of its predecessor court in the Lotus Case, has consistently 
endorsed voluntarism334 and that, no doubt as a consequence, voluntarism 
“remains the orthodoxy in modern doctrine.” 335 He also acknowledges that 
states—which he describes as “the primary actors in international law”336—
are resolutely voluntarist in their approach to the rules that would bind them. 
He writes: 
States rarely accept the binding force of norms that they have 
not consented to . . . . If customary international law is 
something that can be imposed on states in the face of their 
expressed dissent, then it would likely be perceived by them 
as an illegitimate attack on sovereign autonomy.337 
 
 331 As noted above, Charney himself briefly flirted with this argument before conceding 
that state consent was a reality that needed to be overcome. See supra notes 54-56, 63-67 
and accompanying text. 
 332 See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text. 
 333 GREEN, supra note 42, at 246, 250 (citations omitted). 
 334 See id. at 240. 
 335 Id. at 241. 
 336 Id. at 260. 
 337 Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at 254 (“Rejecting voluntarism as a ‘perfect’ account 
of international law’s binding force does not mean that the will of individual states should 
no longer be seen as a crucial element of international law-making.”) (citation omitted). It 
will be recalled that Charney, too, conceded that states were voluntarist in their outlook. 
See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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One can be forgiven for wondering how the voluntarist conception can be 
flawed if the primary actors of the international community, as well as the 
foremost international adjudicative body, subscribe to it. Here we enter the 
realm of speculation, but I suspect the answer lies somewhere in the folds of 
a persistent belief on the part of globalist scholars and their IGO/NGO allies 
that they simply know better. This is not to say that such scholars and allies 
have not advanced specific arguments in support of their anti-voluntarist 
position. They most certainly have. Yet those arguments, taken as a whole, 
are so lacking in logic and substance as to suggest that the position is more 
article-of-faith than anything else. A quick canvass will suffice to demonstrate 
my point. 
One argument advanced is that states are not fully voluntarist all of the 
time. Instead, they “grudgingly accept—in practice if not explicitly—that 
international law is non-voluntarist at times” 338 and “respond to the 
‘compliance pull’ of international law even when it is against their direct 
interests to do so.” 339 But do they really? I would suggest this argument is far 
too jejune by half, for it ignores the very real possibility that states distinguish 
between their near- and long-term self-interests and occasionally willingly 
sacrifice the former to the latter. Indeed, there is nothing strange or rare about 
a state agreeing to an international rule it dislikes, and would otherwise refuse 
its consent to, in the hope that such agreement will secure for it other states’ 
cooperation on different matters going forward. And when such a state 
strategically trades its “quid” for other states’ “quos,” it is no more correct to 
say that it has been coerced than to say that a legislator is coerced when she 
engages in logrolling in the halls of Congress. 
A second argument purporting to show that voluntarism is a fiction focuses 
on, and makes much of, two narrow categories of primary rules that govern 
the conduct of states: jus cogens norms and “the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations.”340 With regard to the former, it is often 
observed that states may not opt out of norms of jus cogens via persistent 
objection (pre-crystallization) or treaty-making (post-crystallization). This is 
true. Yet I would argue that this lack of opt-out rights signifies but a minute 
element of coercion given that (a) these norms are extremely few in number; 
and (b) near-universal acceptance of a norm (i.e. near-universal state consent) 
 
 338 GREEN, supra note 42, at 260 (citation omitted). 
 339 Id. at 258 (citation omitted). 
 340 For “general principles,” see ICJ Statute art. 38(1)(c). These principles are usually 
taken to include basic norms of procedural fairness (e.g., the principle of res judicata) and 
of substantive equity (e.g., the doctrine of “unclean hands”). Of them Green writes: 
It is almost impossible to situate the application of such principles as law, 
binding on states, in a voluntarist account of the system; . . . [T]he idea 
that such principles have been derived from all—or even most—
domestic systems would be an obvious fiction. 
GREEN, supra note 42, at 247 (citations omitted). 
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is required before a norm can even acquire the status of jus cogens. As Green 
concedes, if jus cogens is a form of natural law, then it is natural law firmly 
grounded in voluntarism.341 As for the vaunted “general principles,” these are 
applied coercively only in the context of international adjudication, which 
itself is a rare and often consensual phenomenon. Even in that context they 
are applied only sparingly.342 I leave it to the reader to decide whether a 
coercive and substantively thick world order can be justified—even 
partially—on the basis of such seldom and minor applications of law. For my 
own part I think it reasonably clear that involuntary state submission to, say, 
the principle of res judicata entails an infinitesimal insult to sovereignty 
compared to involuntary state submission to first order rule regimes like the 
Global Migration Compact or the ATT. 
The third argument against the reality of voluntarism relates to the 
assertedly coercive nature of traditional CIL. To the extent the argument is 
simply that tacit consent, through knowing and voluntary inaction, is not the 
same thing as explicit consent, through affirmative words or conduct, we are 
in the land of the obvious and the unremarkable: Tacit and express consent 
are self-evidently different sociological phenomena.343 That said, it is also true 
that both types of consent are capable of protecting a state from coercion. Even 
the most benighted teenager understands the difference between being told 
she must accompany her family to dinner regardless of her wishes and being 
told she must accompany her family to dinner unless she objects in timely 
fashion to going. “You will do X unless you speak up” is a wonderfully 
meaningful ticket to freedom when compared to “You will do X, period.” And 
even the most benighted teenager understands that she cannot hope to garner 
much sympathy if she dissents but does not speak up. What holds for nuclear 
families holds also for the family of nations: Silent dissenters have only 
themselves to blame. 
 
 341 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 213-14 (“Peremptory norms may not require universal 
acceptance, but they do require near-universal acceptance. . . . Jus cogens norms are, or at 
least should be, natural law rules under careful positivist guard”) (emphasis in original) 
(citations omitted). It is helpful to recall that the source of twentieth-century naturalism—
the Nuremberg judgments—were the product of an exceedingly positivistic adjudication. 
Allied prosecutors relied on German treaty commitments, not natural law, to indict on 
crimes against peace and war crimes. See MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR 
CRIMES TRIAL 1945-46, 229-30 (1997). The indictment’s sole natural law count—crimes 
against humanity—drew much publicity but ultimately proved a juridical dead-end in that 
litigation. See id. at 250. 
 342 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 247 (noting “the rare occasions when the ICJ has applied 
general principles”). 
 343 Green suggests this argument when he writes: “The notion of state silence as 
constituting consent for the formation of custom is difficult to reconcile with conceptions 
of genuine consent. This is not least because ‘consent’ and ‘absence of dissent’ are, quite 
simply, different things.” Id. at 248 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
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This undoubtedly is why globalist scholars have tended to quickly pivot 
from minimizing the value (to dissenters) of tacit consent to denying its very 
possibility.344 Over the years they have drawn our attention repeatedly to the 
plight of the unaware state, the not-yet-formed state, and the state that realizes 
its disagreement with a norm only after the point of norm-crystallization—all 
in an effort to demonstrate an allegedly pervasive inability on the part of states 
to object when they would otherwise wish to.345 But this tired litany of cases 
is not nearly as probative as globalists would have us believe. Consider that 
such states’ inability to object translates into negative legal consequences for 
their sovereignty only owing to the extremely unforgiving rules of persistent 
objection that globalist scholars themselves have insisted on.346 What Charney 
stated apropos the norms of jus cogens applies to these rules as well: They are 
not handed down by God but rather are the product of very human 
argumentation and behavior.347 Take away the onerous restrictions on 
unilateral exemption from CIL, as canvassed and criticized above,348 and the 
voluntarists’ “problem” of uninformed and involuntary state silence melts 
away. Conversely, lobby for those restrictions to remain in place whilst citing 
them as evidence of an objectively non-voluntarist world order, and the only 
prize you deserve to win is the one given out for advanced intellectual 
bootstrapping. 
A somewhat different argument involving the persistent-objector 
exemption holds not that the exemption disserves voluntarism but that its 
actual original purpose was to diminish voluntarism’s space. This apparently 
was the view of mid-twentieth-century British scholars Humphrey Waldock 
and Michael Akehurst, who saw the exemption as a way to make it easier for 
binding CIL rules to become established.349 The logic of their position was 
nicely restated in 2000 by a committee of the International Law Association 
when it noted that, in cases where support for a new CIL norm is widespread, 
the exemption ensures that “the convoy of law’s progressive development can 
move forward without having to wait for the slowest vessel.”350 But casting 
the persistent-objector exemption as the facilitator of a coercive international 
 
 344 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 345 See, e.g., id. 
 346 See supra Part I.A.iii. Green himself argues sternly against excusing these three types 
of states from the persistent-objector rule’s timeliness requirement. See GREEN, supra note 
42, at 162-79. For my comment on his general refusal to countenance subsequent objection 
for any reason, see supra note 160. 
 347 See Charney, supra note 13, at 542 (“Today, few suggest that jus cogens norms 
emanate from some deity. Rather, they are the product of human actions, including 
argumentation and behavior.”). 
 348 See supra Part I.A.iii. 
 349 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 236-38. 
 350 INT’L LAW ASSOC., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF 
GENERAL CUSTOMARY LAW, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FORMATION OF 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, CONFERENCE REPORT (London 2000), at 28. 
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order has always been a tough sell. Charney, for one, did not buy it. “[I]t is 
difficult to see,” he wrote in 1985, “how the acceptance of this rule does not 
reflect an acceptance of the consent theory of international law.”351 He was 
right, albeit for reasons that have not always been cleanly stated in the 
literature. Here then, briefly, is why: 
The explosion of new states that attended decolonization following World 
War II posed a problem for the old rules of CIL-formation. Uniformity of state 
practice—something the cozy club of imperial European powers had come 
both to expect and regard as a quasi-requirement of custom—was not likely 
to characterize the newly-emerging, highly diverse community of states.352 
But recognizing that unanimity was no longer likely to occur was the easy 
part; deciding how dissenters would be dealt with going forward, the hard 
part. Two options presented themselves, albeit somewhat inchoately. The 
first, which as we know ultimately gained traction in the 1980s with scholars 
like Charney,353 was to coerce dissenters by outvoting them with prejudice. 
The second, favored by Western powers concerned about being outvoted by 
the more numerous states of the emerging Third World/Global South, was to 
give dissenters a means of escape.354 But through their earlier introduction of 
the Mandatory View during the years 1890-1920,355 those same Western 
powers had put an end to the broad exit rights that had characterized pre-
twentieth century CIL.356 Escape would therefore have to come in the form of 
a pre-crystallization right of exit. Hence the genesis of the modern persistent-
objector exemption. I submit that nothing other than concern to safeguard the 
consent principle can explain why the pre-World War II tendency toward 
unanimous custom gave way, not to majority rule (as it might have), but to 
the narrow escape hatch of persistent objection. 
 
C. “The Consent Principle Is Undemocratic and/or an Affront to State 
Autonomy.” 
 
The third main justification of the Sources Project that courses through the 
literature is nothing if not ambitious. It takes the fight right to the heart of the 
consent principle by arguing that voluntarism is undemocratic and/or an 
affront to state autonomy. It is undemocratic, allegedly, because it allows a 
tiny minority of states—indeed, perhaps even a single state—to frustrate the 
 
 351 Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary 
International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 16 (1985). It will come as no surprise to 
readers to learn that once Charney (correctly) identified the persistent-objector exemption 
as his enemy, he set about to discredit it. See Charney, supra note 13, at 538-42. 
 352 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 232-33. 
 353 See supra Introduction & Part I.A.i. 
 354 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 261. 
 355 See supra note 61. 
 356 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 215-26. 
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agenda of a majority of states.357 It is an affront to state autonomy, again 
allegedly, because autonomy demands that a state have the “positive” ability 
to impose constraints on other states’ behavior via collective international 
action.358 Fortunately, we need not tarry long with either argument. 
The “democracy” argument is superficially appealing but rests on a 
spurious analogy between the domestic and international political orders. 
Recall the basic truism as to why majority rule is tolerable in the first place: 
“We are willing to live under laws we oppose, provided that we have a fair 
opportunity to repeal or amend them.”359 In other words, the minority—be it 
of states or of individuals—accepts the tyranny-of-the-majority today because 
it hopes to become the majority tomorrow. Absent that possibility, majority 
rule is as dictatorial a form of rule as hereditary monarchy. The question, then, 
is whether dissenting states, and their citizenries, have a fair opportunity to 
change international rules they oppose. The answer is plainly no, at least not 
to an extent we would consider remotely acceptable on the domestic level. For 
the possibility of change depends on the existence of a culture of democratic 
politics (i.e. an environment in which multitudinous acts of political 
communication, for the purpose of remonstrance and persuasion, can and do 
take place). If a conservative Missourian chafes under “leftish” laws passed 
by a Democrat-controlled Congress, she can avail herself of a common 
language and common political parties nationwide to win her fellow citizens 
over to her views, achieve a change in the representational makeup of 
Congress in the next election, and thereby secure a change in the laws she 
dislikes. If, on the other hand, the citizenries of Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic overwhelming oppose a “leftish” open-borders agenda 
animating a (hypothetical) majority-imposed global migration compact, they 
have no realistic way of seeking out and winning over other national 
citizenries even within the European Union, let alone worldwide. The various 
communities of the world do not speak the same languages, nor necessarily 
have similar political parties.360 Yes, their national government 
representatives can speak with other national government representatives in 
 
 357 Joel Trachtman writes: “The requirement of consent or unanimity-based decision-
making cannot be defended by reference to democracy. . . . This can easily be seen where 
a single small state has the capacity to block decisions that are desired by the overwhelming 
majority of states.” Joel P. Trachtman, Reports of the Death of Treaty Are Premature, But 
Customary International Law May Have Outlived Its Usefulness, 108 AJIL UNBOUND 36, 
39 (2014). 
 358 See id. (“Assuming for a moment that a state has equal interests in avoiding constraints 
on its behavior and procuring constraints on other states’ behavior, then any voting rule 
should be equally attractive compared to any other voting rule.”). 
 359 Andrew C. McCarthy, Obama’s Judges Continue Thwarting Trump, NAT’L REV. 
(Nov. 10, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/obama-appointed-lawyers-thw 
art-trump-policies-immigration-energy/. 
 360 Nor, I might add, do they have a shared past, which goes some way toward softening 
the blow of losing any given round of electoral politics. 
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the halls of IGOs. But unless those other national governments are elected via 
democratic processes, and unless the Polish, Hungarian and Czech 
governments, as well as their citizenries, can access and participate in those 
processes, effecting changes of position and votes in the IGOs is unlikely. And 
without that real possibility of change, majority rule is like an elegant hand 
fitted with brass knuckles. If the consent principle stands in the way of such a 
hand coming down, that is a good thing, not a bad thing, is it not? 
The “autonomy” argument may or may not be defensible, depending on 
the breadth with which it is pitched. If taken to mean that a state is not fully 
free unless it can constrain any and all types of behavior on the part of other 
states, it rests on a conception of freedom that is alien to a good portion of the 
Western political tradition and conducive to empire building, not state 
sovereignty. If, on the other hand, the argument is taken to mean that a state 
is not fully free unless it can protect itself from the harmful behavior of others, 
it is undoubtedly correct; for both individuals and states, being left in peace is 
the essence of negative liberty. That is why we have police forces at the 
domestic level and collective security at the international. However, beyond 
justifying laws and institutions that protect states from the harmful activity of 
aggressive war, it is unclear how much globalization this version of the 
autonomy argument can support. I have argued, for example, that it cannot 
sustain that portion of the modern human rights movement which targets 
intrastate malfeasance.361 I have also suggested why, apropos negative-
externality-producing behavior, it cannot justify international solutions that 
are either unnecessary or substantively flawed.362 At the end of the day, if the 
world had only that quantum of international law that the autonomy argument 
could support, it would have considerably less international law than it has 
now. And that, I submit, would be a very good thing indeed. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There was nothing inevitable about the Sources Project. We know this 
because we can rather easily imagine a world governed by secondary rules 
different from the ones it has promoted. Consider a world in which the 
following rules and principles obtain: 
• If a state declines to ratify a treaty (or reserves to a part thereof), 
it remains legally exempt from any subsequently arising identical 
CIL until such time as it clearly indicates an intent to be bound by 
it (via words or deeds). This rule reflects the ICJ’s approach in 
North Sea and effectively puts an end to Sheepdogging. 
• An expression of normative opinio juris contained in a resolution 
does not mature into binding CIL simply because states begin to 
 
 361 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 362 See supra notes 317-330 and accompanying text. 
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act in conformity with it. For aspirational norms to transition into 
legal norms, evidence of genuine descriptive opinio juris must be 
found to exist. This rule effectively puts an end to Fake Custom. 
• NSAs are at most “finders” of CIL. If they find it irresponsibly 
(i.e. from a posture of advocacy), they are to be criticized, not 
elevated to the status of CIL “makers.” The opinio juris of NSAs 
can never give rise to new CIL of its own force, and states lose no 
rights by failing to respond to it. These rules effectively put an 
end to Funhouse CIL. 
• A single, formally-stated objection to an evolving CIL norm is 
enough to establish a state’s exemption from that norm. Once 
established, the exemption continues until such time as a state 
clearly abandons it (via words or deeds). The burden of proof is 
on those alleging abandonment. Subsequent objection- and-exit is 
available, with immediate effect, from any CIL norm that does not 
implicate significant reliance interests (e.g. human rights norms). 
It is available from norms implicating significant reliance 
interests pending the running of an adequate notice period. These 
rules align CIL-withdrawal rights with treaty-withdrawal rights, 
meaningfully preserve the element of state consent in CIL-
formation, and safeguard state sovereignty over intra-state 
matters. 
• The international order exists to serve the needs of individual 
states, not vice versa. This means that treaty commitments are not 
presumed to be permanent and that international actors have a 
duty to respect and be solicitous of domestic constitutional 
processes. This principle effectively puts an end to the gimmicks 
and tricks discussed in Part I.B.ii. 
• In the United States, the federal judiciary enforces (as federal 
common law) only those CIL norms that are authorized by the 
Constitution or endorsed by Congress. Consequently, CIL norms 
that derive from treaties that Congress has refused to ratify or 
implement are judicially unenforceable. There is a general 
presumption against the self-execution of treaties, and this 
presumption is heightened in the case of Senate-only ratified 
treaties that concern intra-state matters. These rules reflect and 
expand upon the spirit of the holdings in Sosa and Medellin. 
• Ex ante congressional authorization of international agreements 
negotiated by the President must be specific and genuine, not 
extrapolated, implied or manufactured. If the President seeks to 
implement an international political commitment via legally 
binding domestic regulations, he must first obtain formal 
approval of that commitment from Congress. These rules 
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effectively put an end to Executive Agreements+, Fake 
Authorization, Henkin’s Revenge, and Secret Henkin’s Revenge. 
If these proposed rules and principles strike us as outdated and even a tad 
outlandish, it is not because they lack internal consistency or logic. It is 
because we have been conditioned to believe that the phenomenon they 
protect—state sovereignty—disserves humanity. But if that conditioning is 
false, if sovereignty serves humanity by ensuring that political decisions are 
taken at a level close enough to the People that the People might reasonably 
hope to influence them, then these rules and principles take on an entirely 
different hue. They become indispensable and, I would suggest, the only 
moral way forward. While Koh has invoked the film Casablanca in promising 
his fellow globalists that “we’ll always have Paris,”363 my nomination for best 
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